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Abstract
Initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is a costly practice that decreases the IPO
proceeds accruing to the issuing firms and can derail a firm’s growth objectives. The
purpose of this correlational study was to determine the relationship between share
retention, underwriter reputation, and IPO underpricing among a population of IPOs
issued in Jamaica. The efficient market hypothesis served as the theoretical framework
for this study. Archived data for 52 IPOs issued in Jamaica from 1986 to 2018 were
collected and Spearman’s correlation matrix and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors regression analysis were applied. The outcomes of this study indicated no
significant relationship between share retention and IPO underpricing, α = .1 and α = .05,
r = .059, p = .35; however, there was partial acceptance of the alternative hypothesis that
underwriter reputation is related to IPO underpricing at α = .1, r = .234, p = .055, but not
α = .05. Additionally, underpricing was higher for IPOs supported by the high reputation
underwriters, and share retention was a slightly better predictor of IPO underpricing for
this group of IPOs, R2 = .02, p = .31 versus R2 = .01, p = .75. Finally, the overall model
indicated that the independent variables did not jointly explain IPO underpricing, F(2, 45)
= .78, p = .455, R2 = .032. The results of this study might contribute to social change
because successful IPOs can increase employment opportunities as well as improve
income distribution and socioeconomic indicators for the communities served by IPO
firms.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Each day, companies around the world list on various stock exchanges for the first
time via an initial public offering (IPO) to capitalize on growth opportunities, and build
sustainable businesses (Bateni & Asghari, 2014; Bradley & Camp, 2014). The IPO option
of financing is one of three traditional options; the other two include bank financing and
capital market debt (Perry, 2016). The decision to issue an IPO represents one of the most
significant strategic shifts in a company’s operations (Colombelli, 2015). The popularity
of IPOs as an avenue to raise capital may explain the sustained interest in IPO
underpricing (Asiri & Haji, 2015; Kumar, 2017; Thorsell & Isaksson, 2014; Yin, Yang,
& Mehran, 2015). IPO underpricing provides the investor with significant first-day gains
while simultaneously reducing the IPO proceeds accruing to the issuer by leaving money
on the table (Bateni & Asghari, 2014; Miloud, 2014; Ritter, 2015).
The IPO financing option also brings into focus the importance of the signaling
effect of share retention, as well as the role of the underwriter in balancing the needs of
the investor for attractive first-day returns and that of the issuer for maximum IPO
proceeds (Asiri & Haji, 2015; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Mazouz, Agyei-Ampomah,
Saadouni, & Yin, 2013; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015). Xu (2014) added that higher levels of
the IPO underpricing relate to higher information asymmetry between the IPO firms and
potential investors. The importance of share retention and underwriter reputation as
drivers of IPO underpricing is well documented in the literature. However, with evidence
supporting both sides of the discussion, there is no consensus about the impact of these
variables on the nature and level of the underpricing.
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Background of the Problem
Every company, regardless of type, size, industry, or mode of operations, needs
access to reliable funding sources to facilitate successful operations, as well as achieve
growth objectives, and the IPO is a popular vehicle for accessing such funding
(Chandrashekar, 2014; Chughtai, Azeem, Amara, & Ali, 2014; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015).
However, while going public represents a critical stage in the firm’s life cycle, it also
exposes the firm to IPO underpricing and increased public scrutiny (Chandrashekar,
2014; Dolvin & Fernhaber, 2014; Wu, 2014). In issuing an IPO, the firm’s objective is to
maximize the total proceeds (Bahadir, Dekinder, & Kohli, 2015), but underpricing
impedes the achievement of that objective and is, therefore, a concern for issuers (Bacon
& Arkorful, 2015; Wu, 2014).
Early researchers explained IPO underpricing by pointing to information
asymmetry among the principal IPO stakeholders-issuers, investors, and underwriters as
the primary cause (Baron, 1982; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Rock, 1986). Moreover, much of
the existing research on this topic sampled companies and IPOs primarily from
developed, emerging, and large developing economies (Ritter, 2017). Chen, Wang, Tong,
and Zhu (2017) who investigated the relationship between IPO underpricing and
economic freedom across 22 countries questioned why the degree of IPO underpricing
vary so widely between developed and developing countries. IPO underpricing can
negatively impact a company’s IPO proceeds, its capacity to capitalize on growth
prospects, and by implication, employment opportunities (Miloud, 2014; Ritter, 2015).
Therefore, it is essential that company executives deciding to issue IPOs, including those
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operating in small developing countries, understand how the number of shares retained
by their firms’ internal stakeholders, as well as their choice of IPO underwriter, may
assuage the negative impact IPO underpricing (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Jiang, Stohs,
& Xie, 2015; Ritter, 2015).
Problem Statement
IPO underpricing is a costly practice for companies using IPO to raise capital
because of the amount of money (shortfall in IPO proceeds) underpricing leaves on the
table (Mayes & Alqahtani, 2015). For the period 1990 to 2012, average IPO underpricing
in the United States was 19.7%, which reduced IPO proceeds per IPO by an average of
$49.94 million (Thompson, 2016). The general business problem was that IPO
underpricing and the related shortfall in IPO proceeds continue to impair the growth
prospects for some companies. The specific business problem was that some executives
of IPO companies wanting to list on the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) may not
understand the relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the
IPO underwriter, and IPO underpricing (that is, the stock’s percentage return on the first
day of trading).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter,
and IPO underpricing. The independent variables were IPO share retention ratio,
measured by the percentage of IPO shares retained by the firm, and IPO underwriter
reputation operationalized as underwriter’s rank based on market share of IPOs
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supported. The dependent variable was IPO underpricing as reflected by the first-day
market return on the IPO stock. The population consists of companies that issued IPOs
from January 1986 to July 2018 and trading on the JSE.
The results of this study may contribute to the business community by providing
information to executives seeking financing via IPO on how to optimize the IPO process
to ensure successful IPOs. The research outcomes may also generate better investment
decisions by forcing increased information disclosure from issuers to investors. This
study may contribute to social change by helping company executives and policymakers
in small developing economies understand how successful IPOs can create employment
opportunities, reduce income inequality, improve socioeconomic indicators such as
education and health, and the overall standard of living across households within the
communities served by these firms.
Nature of the Study
According to Park and Park (2016), the researcher must first consider the
occurrence or event under investigation before selecting the research method appropriate
to interrogate, clarify, and aid the understanding of the phenomenon. The quantitative
method examines the relationship between variables using statistical procedures and
numeric data (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). In line with the precedence set by previous
researchers on this topic, such as Cornanic and Novak (2015), I adopted the quantitative
research method for this study. The objective of the qualitative approach is to understand
how individual or groups view a social problem (Bernard, 2013), while for the mixed
method approach, the researcher purposefully combines the qualitative and quantitative
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methods to gain multifaceted insights into an area of focus (Chiang-Hanisko, Newman,
Dyess, Piyakong, & Liehr, 2016; Van Griensven, Moore, & Hall, 2014). Therefore the
qualitative and mixed method approaches were not appropriate for this study.
I employed a correlational research design for this study. Correlational studies are
appropriate if the objective of the research is to determine and explore the relationship
that exists between quantifiable variables (Curtis, Comiskey, & Dempsey, 2016). The
experimental design, though considered, was not appropriate for this study. Researchers
use experiments to determine an outcome by controlling selected variable(s), subjecting
participants to specific conditions (D'Onofrio, Lahey, Turkheimer, & Lichtenstein, 2013)
or creating equivalence between the control and treatment groups by the random
allocation of participants to each of these groups (Crane, Henriques, Husted, & Matten,
2017). These conditions did not exist for this study.
Research Questions
The primary question for this quantitative correlational study was: What is the
relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, reputation of the IPO underwriter, and
IPO underpricing? The following secondary questions support this primary research
question.
RQ-1: What is the relationship, if any, between a firm’s IPO share retention ratio
and IPO underpricing?
RQ-2: What is the relationship, if any, between the reputation of the IPO
underwriter and IPO underpricing?
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RQ-3: Does the reputation of the IPO underwriter impact the relationship between
IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing?
RQ-4: What is the joint relationship, if any, between firm’s IPO share retention
ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter, and IPO underpricing?
Hypotheses
For this study and in line with the primary and supporting research questions, I
examined the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H01: There is no statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing.
H03: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has no statistically significant impact
on the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
Ha3: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has a statistically significant impact
on the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H04: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter do not jointly explain IPO underpricing.
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Ha4: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter jointly explain IPO underpricing.
Theoretical Framework
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), credited to Fama (1970), formed the
theoretical framework for this study. The foundation principles of the EMH are that all
investors share the same subjective probability distribution about the future value of
shares, investors’ return is indicative of their risk appetite, and that market efficiency
exists in three forms (Bertella, Pires, Feng, & Stanley, 2014; Fama, 1970). According to
Fama, market efficiency in its strongest form occurs when the securities’ prices reflect all
available information, while the weak and semi strong forms exist when the stock price
reflects historical pricing and public information respectively.
Under conditions of the strong form of market efficiency, the stock price reflects
all available information and should compensate for asymmetric information among IPO
stakeholders (Jiang et al., 2015; Liu & Forester, 2014; Wu, 2014). Additionally, the
suggestion by proponents of the EMH that shares are neither undervalued nor overvalued
(Árendás & Chovancová, 2015) does not support the persistence of underpricing
identified by Ritter (2015). However, Lowry and Schwert (2004) found that the IPO
pricing process is somewhat market efficient because shares prices reflect public
information. Therefore, investors and company executives should understand the
principles of EMH given the potential impact of available information including their
decisions on stock price and the firm’s value (Degutis & Novickytė, 2014). The
documented link between information asymmetry and IPO underpricing, based
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particluarly on the work of Baron (1982), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Rock (1986),
provides a basis for the adoption of the EMH as the theoretical frame this study.
Definition of Terms
Throughout this study, a few terms appear repeatedly. These terms may vary in
meaning depending on the source or the topic. Therefore, definitions are appropriate to
ensure that the reader understands what these terms mean in the context of this study.
Efficient market: According to Fama (1970), an efficient market is one in which
the price of the stock fully reflects all available information includingthe firm’s
fundamental value.
Information asymmetry: Under conditions of information asymmetry, one party
has more or better information than the other, creating a potential imbalance of power
and setting the stage for possible opportunistic behavior (Fleischer & Staudt, 2014; Imam
& Jaber, 2014). In the IPO process, information asymmetry exists between the following
stakeholders, potential investors and issuers, issuers and underwriters, as well as among
diverse groups of investors (Hull, Kwak, & Walker, 2016; Miloud, 2014; Regalli &
Soana, 2013).
Initial public offering (IPO): Also referred to as going public, an IPO denotes the
first time a privately owned company publicly sells its stocks on an open market (Asiri &
Haji, 2015; Murthy, Singh, & Gupta, 2016; Jiang et al., 2015).
IPO underpricing: Underpricing occurs when the price of the IPO shares is lower
than the intrinsic or true market value (Bateni & Asghari, 2014; Peterle & Berk, 2016).
This practice results in a positive first-day initial return typically measured in percentage
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(Leong & Sundarasen, 2015). The underpricing ratio, according to Wong, Wei, and Chau,
(2014) is:
Underpricing ratio = (Day 1 Closing price - Offer price) ÷ offer price
Market efficiency: Market efficiency can exist in three forms: (a) in the strong
form, the stock price interprets and reflects all available information (b) the weak form,
indicates that the stock price reflects only historical price information, and (c) for the
semi strong the price of the stock adjusts only to public information (Fama, 1970; Ţiţan,
2015).
Money left on the table: Money left on the table (MLOT) refers to the reduction in
total IPO proceeds accruing to the issuing firm as a result of underpricing (Cornanic &
Novak, 2015; Kesten & Mungan, 2015). In quantitative terms, Thompson (2016) defined
money left on the table as absolute underpricing that is the difference between the firstday closing price and the initial offer price, multiplied by the number of shares offered.
For example, MLOT = absolute underpricing x offering proceeds (Wong et al., 2014)
Share retention: Share retention refers to the block of shares not made available
for sale to the public in the IPO but held by firm insiders e.g., the owner(s), directors, or
executive management (He, Cordeiro, & Shaw, 2015). In the formulaic expression, share
retention is the total number of shares retained divided by the total number of shares
outstanding (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; He et al., 2015).
Small island developing states (SIDS): Small island developing states (SIDS) are
coastal countries that share similar but specific sustainable development challenges
relating to size, dependence, and vulnerability, which include limited resources that
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deprive them of the benefits of economies of scale and small domestic markets making
them highly dependent on international trade (United Nations-OHRLLS, 2015). These
countries also rely heavily on remote external markets making them vulnerable to
external shocks, as well as susceptible to communication and transportation inefficiencies
and related high costs (United Nations-OHRLLS, 2015).
Underwriters: Underwriters support the IPO process by bringing an IPO to
market and facilitate the sales of shares/securities to potential public investors (Wu &
Wan, 2014). IPOs generally require the underwriting/brokerage services of professional
underwriters (Kesten & Mungan, 2015).
Underwriter reputation: An underwriter reputation depends on its equity
marketing or IPO history (Cao, Chen, & Wang, 2015). The reputation of the underwriter
is a function of the market share of the number and/or value of IPOs brought to market
and researchers use this basis to rank underwriters (Cao et al., 2015; He et al., 2015; Wu
& Wan, 2014).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Research assumptions are accepted principles and ideas that emerge from
previous research work or other contexts and may represent aspects of the research but
which cannot be proven or demonstrated to be true (Abdulai, 2015; Francis, 2014). While
the goal was not to impose any undue restrictions on this study, the following underlying
assumptions are noteworthy. First, I assumed that a linear relationship existed between
the variables, the sample data points were independent and patterned a normal
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distribution (see Zhang, Liu, Cole, & Belkin, 2015), and investors are risk averse with
returns related to their risk appetite (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Second, I assumed that each
company in the sample, irrespective of classification, reported accurate information to the
JSE, including audited financial and nonfinancial data in each reporting period in the
required format.
Not classifying IPOs by separators such as company size, industry, or mode of
operation, I assumed that the variables and relationships under investigation would not be
sufficiently different across these dimensions to significantly influence the outcomes. The
fourth assumption was that the operations of the JSE, including data governance, aligned
to the international standards required for exchanges and as such the integrity and
authenticity of the data are not principal concerns for investment communities. The fifth
assumption was that the characteristics of companies whether multinational corporations
(MNCs), small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or local conglomerates listed on the JSE
typify companies operating in other small developing countries, thereby allowing for
application of the results across territories. The final assumption of this study was that the
data collection and archiving procedures adopted by the JSE are in line with international
benchmarks and that the data governed by these procedures are exhaustive for the period
defined in this research.
Limitations
Limitations are potential weaknesses in this research work generally outside of
the control of the researcher (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013; Simon, 2015). The first limitation
of this study was that the analyses span a data set that includes only companies that
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issued IPOs in Jamaica from 1986 to 2018 and currently trading on the JSE. Despite the
complexity and scope of the business arena and the possible range of industry
classifications, the second limitation is that there is no distinction in this study between
industries or company size; instead, the period of analysis to define the appropriate
companies for the sample. Third, although there may be other proxies that can
appropriately represent the variables used in this study, the proxy selected for each
variable depended on data availability and the opportunity to collect the data
independently.
Delimitations
The delimitations are characteristics such as objectives, research questions, and
variables, supporting theories and data set that can limit the scope, set boundaries for
research, and usually determined by the researcher (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013; Simon,
2015). Although this study is about an empirical analysis of IPO underpricing in small
developing countries, the study focused only on Jamaica. A multi country approach to
this investigation would have been ideal or even optimal, providing for the inclusion of
other countries classified in this group both within and outside of the Caribbean. The
multi country approach could allow for the assessment of the impact of dissimilarities
and diversity in history, geography, resource availability, and stage of development.
However, this multi country approach was prohibitive from both from the
perspective of monetary and time commitments and therefore not adopted. Instead, I
limited the analysis to Jamaica and the data set to IPOs issued between the periods 1986
and 2018. There is, however, precedence for this approach, as demonstrated by the works
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of Bansal and Khanna (2013) and Mazouz et al. (2013). The assumption that Jamaica
sufficiently represented the group of small developing economies compensated for this
restriction and allowed for useful insights and indications from the study about the causes
of IPO underpricing and the impact on companies operating in other territories.
Significance of the Study
Contribution to Business Practice
This study adds value to the business community in that the findings may help
company executives in Jamaica and other small developing countries plan for and access
financing via IPOs. The results of this study may indicate the existence and extent of IPO
underpricing, providing the option to account for the funding shortfall typical from this
phenomenon in their strategic and financial planning process. Having the data and
analyses to show that IPO underpricing exists in their primary operating space may also
allow companies and organizations lobbying on their behalf to frame, justify, and present
arguments to minimize IPO underpricing.
The outcomes of this study may also help companies to more effectively plan for
the IPO proceeds given that Gumanti, Lestari, and Mannan (2017) found that in
Indonesia, IPOs slated to finance investment or growth generated lower underpricing and
hence less money left on the table than IPOs designed to fund operations. Additionally,
Ganesamoorthy and Shankar (2014), who studied the Indian market, suggested that new
investments for business expansion bear results post incubation. Moreover, the
expectations for firms with sufficient IPO proceeds include the transformation of
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production techniques to achieve improved corporate social performance (CSP) (Luo,
Qian, & Ren, 2015).
Regulatory and government policymakers who seek to create a business-friendly
environment may use the findings of this study as a guide to stimulate employment and
hence growth and development in small economies. Ritter (2015) reported that from 1996
to 2010, the average U.S. company added 822 jobs after a successful IPO and Pandes and
Robinson (2014) indicated that the reduction in IPOs in the United States in the past
decade (2000 to 2012) resulted in the loss of millions of jobs. From the perspective of the
investor, the outcomes of my study may lead to more informed investment decisions by
forcing increased information disclosure from issuing companies, providing investors
with greater access to information. While existing mandatory disclosure requirements in
the form of consumer protection laws increase information availability (Lager, 2016), the
findings from this study could further influence expectations of investors regarding
access to information as well as the drivers of underpricing. However, these disclosures
and reporting requirements can be a costly and cumbersome barriers to accessing the
funding markets especially for small businesses (Lager, 2016).
Implications for Social Change
The outcomes of this study may contribute to social change in the following ways.
Successful IPOs lead to increased growth and profitability for the firm (Ritter, 2015),
which may help to improve compensation and working conditions for firm employees.
Firms that are able to maximize IPO proceeds may also be able to, through growth and
expansion, increase employment opportunities for the communities which they serve
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(Ritter, 2015). The increased employment may create additional opportunities to improve
income distribution, socioeconomic indicators such as health and education, as well as
improve the quality of life and overall standard of living across households (Sappin,
2016).
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
Introduction
The body of research evidence that supports the presence and persistence of IPO
underpricing is expansive and commensurate with the interest and scrutiny from market
players and research scholars (Jeribi, Jeribi, & Jarboui, 2014). The investigation of IPO
underpricing spans country borders (Ritter, 2015), business cycles (Henry & Gregoriou,
2014), and diverse market conditions (Hedhili & Kammoun, 2014). The frequency of
IPO issues may also explain the level of publicity and interest from academia as well as
the extensive documentation on the subject (Cichello & Lamdin, 2016; Liu & Forester,
2014). Numerous empirical studies exist on the factors that could impact the first-day
returns of IPOs, however meaningful comparison of outcomes to determine statistically
significant and economic relevance can be problematic to establish because of differences
in model and variable specifications as well as variation in research design, and choice of
control variables (Butler, Keefe, & Kieschnick, 2014).
As reflected in the review of academic literature that follows, there is a broad pool
of research work on IPO underpricing and the possible impact of share retained by the
firm’s internal stakeholders and the reputation of the IPO underwriter. Butler et al. (2014)
who examined 48 potential determinants of IPO underpricing indicated that share
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retention and underwriter reputation, the two independent variables for this study are
among the 16 most robust determinants of IPO underpricing. This breadth of IPO
information commenced with the foundation theorists who, based on their research,
validated information asymmetry as one of the primary determinants of IPO underpricing
(Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1989), with ensuing researchers reporting both
supporting and opposing empirical outcomes (Katti & Phani, 2016). However, the
geographical focus of these previous research works has been primarily on developed,
emerging, and the larger developing economies (Boulton, Smart, & Zutter, 2017; Ritter,
2017; Thompson, 2016) with limited emphasis on small developing countries. Given that
underpricing is higher for developing countries relative to developed economies (Song et
al.s,2017), and that the absence of small developing countries in much of the previous
research, it may be helpful to explore IPO underpricing in the context of small
developing countries, using Jamaica as the proxy for such smaller economies.
Search Strategy and Organization of the Literature Review
The starting point in executing the research strategy for this study was to identify
the key terms and phrases to guide the literature search. These terms came from the
problem and purpose statements, as well as the research questions and related hypotheses
and included IPOs, IPO pricing, information asymmetry, IPO underpricing, share
retention, underwriter reputation and small developing countries. Using these as initial
search parameters, I conducted multiple searches using ABI / INFORM Complete,
Business Source Complete, Emerald Management, ProQuest, and SAGE Premier. These
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databases provide access to thousands of full-text academic articles from peer-reviewed
journals.
The scope of the research. By reviewing the titles and/or abstracts of the over
350 articles, books, seminal works, and reports that surfaced from the sources listed
above, I further refined using alignment to the problem and purpose statements as the
guide to achieve a final reference count of 264 including 249 articles. Tables 1 and 2
contain the classification of the total references by publication type, date and peerreviewed features. The date and peer-reviewed requirements for the articles are at 86.75%
and 94.38% compliance levels respectively.
Table 1
Reference Count: Peer-Reviewed Compliance
Publication
Articles
Books
Websites
Government/International Agency
Total

Peerreviewed
235

235

Non-peerreviewed
14
3
9
3
29

Total
249
3
9
3
264

% Peerreviewed
94.38%
0%
0%
0%
89.02%

Table 2
Reference Count: Date Compliance
Publication

Current (i.e.,
under 5 years)
216

Dated (i.e.,
over 5 years)
33
3
3

225

39

Articles
Books
Websites
6
Government/ International Agency 3
Total

249
3
9
3

%
Current
86.75%
0%
66.67%
100%

264

85.23%

Total

18
Organization of the review. The literature review comprises four broad
components. The first includes an overview and the restatement of the purpose of the
study and the related hypotheses to provide context for the review of literature. The
second component contains an in-depth discussion of the fundamentals, relevance, and
empirical evidence of the EMH which forms the theoretical framework for this study.
The third part of the literature review encompasses a discourse on the independent
variables, IPO share retention ratio, and the reputation of the IPO underwriter. The
discussion on each of these independent variables, includes the definition, measurement,
and relationship, if any, to the dependent variable as defined in the purpose statement of
this study. Following a similar format as the third component, the final segment of this
literature review comprises a detailed discussion on the dependent variable, IPO
underpricing including the definition, measurement, the impact on the actual IPO
proceeds and money left on the table. This element of the literature review also includes
the information asymmetry-based explanations for IPO underpricing purported by the
foundation theorists, as well as evidence from related empirical research.
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship, if any, between IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO
underwriter, and the first-day market return on the IPO stock price (IPO underpricing). In
line with this purpose statement, I examined the following null and alternative
hypotheses:
H01: There is no statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
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Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing.
H03: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has no statistically significant impact
on the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
Ha3: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has statistically significant impact on
the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H04: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter do not jointly explain IPO underpricing.
Ha4: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter jointly explain IPO underpricing.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
Foundation theorists of IPO underpricing including Baron (1982), Leland and
Pyle (1977), and Rock (1986) explained that IPO underpricing, the dependent variable in
this study, in the context of information asymmetry. However, in an efficient market, the
stock price already reflects all relevant information as soon as they become available
(Naseer & Tariq, 2015) and should therefore eliminate concerns about information
asymmetry. Accordingly, the EMH implies that the investment should focus on the
investors’ risk and return tradeoff and not information asymmetry and by extension
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underpricing (see Naseer & Tariq, 2015). Additionally, Hu (2014) implied that in the face
of opportunistically behavior by the firm, if markets are efficient and integrated, then
market gains (including underpricing) should be zero. Such is the nature of the debate
surrounding the EMH and it is this debate around the presence of market efficiency,
information asymmetry and by implication IPO underpricing that supports the adoption
of the EMH as the theoretical framework for this study.
Despite having building blocks dating back to the 16th-century, Fama (1970)
presented the central tenets of the EMH as documented in the current body of literature.
According to the EMH, as enunciated by Fama (1970), all investors share the same
subjective probability distribution about the future value of their stock investment and
investors’ investment returns align to their risk appetite (Bertella et al., 2014; Fama,
1970). According to Fama, the market efficiency exists in three forms: in the strong form,
the market price of the stock fully reflects all available information. Market efficiency
can also exist in the weak and semi strong forms where securities prices reflect only
historical pricing and price information and public information respectively (Fama,
1970). The EMH and its main principles are founded on the concept of information
asymmetry which underpins the foundation arguments of and the relevance to IPO
underpricing.
The principles of market efficiency that support the EMH seem consistent with
the pronouncements of Gibson (1889). According to Gibson, when shares go public, the
market-driven acquired value represents the best unbiased representation of the
information available on these stocks. However, market efficiency rarely exists in its
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purest form and market efficiency is not static but evolves such that periods of both
market efficiency and market inefficiency can exist (Árendás & Chovancová, 2015).
Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) found that to be true centuries before. In their investigation of
stocks trading on the Berlin Stock Exchange in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
Gehrig and Fohlin found that informational efficiency changed over time. It is therefore
important for executives to understand that the stock market displays varying levels of
efficiency over time and accordingly prices may signal varying level of company
information to investors.
Fama (1970) stated that an ideal market is one in which security prices provide
accurate signals about resource allocation. The implication of Fama’s position is that
securities prices and the retention of shares by management release signalsto the market
(and investors) about the firm’s operations, including production-investment decisions,
because under conditions of market efficiency, the prices of securities fully reflect
available information on the companies (Fama, 1970; Keefe, 2014; Naseer & Tariq,
2015).
The EMH is one of the most controversial economic theories of the last halfcentury with questions raised about its relevance and empirical validity (Árendás &
Chovancová, 2015; Degutis & Novickytė, 2014; Hu, 2014). According to Ţiţan (2015),
market efficiency is difficult to test resulting in inconclusive empirical outcomes. De
Sousa, Campos, and Howden (2015) lamented that as a hypothesis, EMH does not meet
the two necessary conditions of a hypothesis; a logical proof of the EMH does not exist
and it does not meet any rigorous empirical test without critical reservations. As such, de
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Sousa et al. advocated that the EMH is more of a conjecture that continues to trigger
controversy. With increased speculation, instability, and vulnerability to shocks in the
financial system, the EMH is perpetually on trial by the global financial markets and
economies (Chakrabarti, 2015), without consensus on the verdict. The debate
surrounding the EMH and its implications for investors’ behavior continue with
theoretical and empirical studies both supporting and invalidating the findings.
An efficient market reflects all meaningful information, and there should not be
any undervalued or overvalued shares (Árendás & Chovancová, 2015). Also, the
presence and persistence of asset-pricing anomalies, such as IPO underpricing, may cause
researchers to challenge the assertion that asset returns cannot be predicted (Chakrabarti,
2015). Further, the IPO pricing processes create a mechanism outside the self-regulating
market framework, which does not fully incorporate public information and may suggest
information asymmetry in favor of the underwriter (Lowry & Schwert, 2004). For
example, the IPO pricing process contravenes the principles of the efficient market when
prestigious underwriters price the offer in line with the lower, historical value based on
industry fundamentals (Chua, 2014; Ojo, 2014).
The information advantage of the issuers relative to the investors is critical to
price setting process for an IPO (Imam & Jaber, 2014) and contradicts the principles of
EMH (Liu & Forester, 2014). This argument seems to find support in the report by
Prorokowski and Roszkowska (2014) that in the global financial crisis environment
investors are more prudent towards equity investments in emerging markets. Therefore,
in this example, a lower offer price and hence underpricing would be necessary to

23
compensate investors for assuming the risks associated with investing in a company for
which complete information does not exist (de Oliveira & Martelanc, 2014; Liu &
Forester, 2014; Wu, 2014). This argument appears to controverts one of the central
themes of the EMH that share price reflect varying levels of market information.
Furthermore, the market anomaly found by Liu and Forrester (2014), when they
investigated 6,247 firms that issued IPOs between 1987 and 2012 could imply that the
EMH continues to be vulnerable to criticism that complete information exists in an
efficient market environment. Liu and Forester also suggested that management decisions
can impact IPO performance, implying a misalignment with the principles of EMH. The
EMH’s indication that prices reflect varying levels of information could contradict the
potential investors’ need for underpricing to compensate for the risk of investing in a new
company or the importance of signals such as share retention and underwriter reputation.
Fleischer and Staudt (2014) examined 1,326 IPOs issued between 2004 and 2011
and found evidence of another example of empirical pricing anomaly. The results of this
research work by Fleischer and Staudt indicated that taxes, though not considered in the
EMH framework, could benefit either the issuer or investor in the IPO process. While
Alcaniz, Gomez-Bezares, and Ugarte (2017) found evidence that information
(intellectual) disclosure remains consistent with the semi strong form of EMH but had no
impact on IPO underpricing.
The context of EMH implies that the offer price adjusts only partially to the
information available in the IPO pricing period leading to a positive relationship between
the offer price and underpricing (Boulton, Smart, & Zutter, 2013). The market correction
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occurs because the efficient market mechanism, as defined, had no influence on the
pricing of the IPO shares, or the investors’ decisions made in this environment of
information asymmetry (Fleischer & Staudt, 2014; Regalli & Soana, 2013). These
adjustments could mean that the IPO offer price did not previously reflect the required
level of information or the company's fundamental value, as the EMH seem to imply.
Additionally, the presence of asset-pricing anomalies such as IPO underpricing leads to
questions about the empirical strength of the EMH given that underpricing should
compensate investors for investing in an IPO company in the absence of information
equity (Liu & Forester, 2014; Wu, 2014). The evidence from empirical studies that
anomalies such as IPO underpricing exist and may be required by potential investors
raises questions about the EMH principle that price reflect varying levels of available
information.
Among the theorists who questioned the validity of the EMH are the proponents
of behavioral finance. Behavioral finance is a significant contributor to the field of
finance by applying psychology models and theories to explain investor behavior in the
financial market particularly as related to their patterns in financial decision making
(Tetteh & Hayfron, 2017). The starting point for this theory is the human factor – what
people do and why (Kapor, 2014). While the EMH focuses on the rationality of investors,
stock market prices reflecting all available information, and investors making decisions
based on probability distribution and risk appetite, the advocates of the behavioral
theories argue that investors remain susceptible to other influencers such as utility
maximization, psychological and socioeconomic factors such as age, education, capital
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invested, culture, and profession (Fama, 1970; Hu, 2014; Huang, Shieh, & Kao, 2016;
Kapor, 2014; Ritter, 2003a; Tetteh & Hayfron, 2017).
These psychological biases influence their norms, beliefs, and preferences and
hence manifest in their behaviors and habits (Tetteh & Hayfron, 2017). Additionally, the
psychological factors better explain the irrational behaviors, irregularities, anomalies,
and/or inconsistencies observed, identified, or experienced in the market and contradict
the EMH’s rationality assumption (Huang et al., 2016; Tetteh & Hayfron, 2017).
Additionally, Huang et al. (2016), as well as Tetteh and Hayfron (2017), concurred that
the arguments of the traditional theories cannot adequately explain some of the
systematic errors that can affect the market price of assets causing irrational decisions,
inefficient placement of resources, market anomalies, and volatilities. By understanding
how people react, investors may be able to modify their behaviors to achieve more
rational and profitable outcomes while minimizing the psychological biases in investment
process and undue exposure to adverse consequences such as higher transaction costs
(Yusuf, 2015). The suggestions by behavioral theorists that dynamics other than the
traditional factors such as risk appetite may influence investors’ decisions could explain
why potential investors may be willing to participate in the IPOs of new companies and
consider signals of firm quality such as share retention and underwriter reputation.
According to Ritter (2003a), the prospect theory, which is a part of the broad
behavioral finance group of theories, is purely descriptive, assumes loss aversion, and
helps to explain choices in the context of uncertainty. Ritter also argued that behavioral
finance incorporates the behavioral principle of framing in the choices individuals face,
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and as such if given two related options, an individual may choose to treat the events
separately or integrate them. Ritter suggested that this framing principle may help to
explain why firms seem not to negotiate harder with their IPO underwriter to minimize
the amount of money left on the table. When issuing an IPO, the company
owner/executive integrates the options of IPO underpricing and reduced IPO proceeds
with share dilution, and considers the former a net better option and hence does not push
for less underpricing (Ritter, 2003a). The IPO underwriter may capitalize on this
behavioral finance process adopted by the owner to build investor loyalty through
additional underpricing (Ritter, 2003a; Wu, 2014). The arguments of behavioral finance
and its suggested influence on the relationship between the principals of IPO issuing firm
and underwriters may underscore the relevance of underwriter reputation as a signal to
the market and a variable in this study.
The contradictions and empirical anomalies outlined above may help to explain
why the empirical evidence on IPO pricing is such a puzzle to supporters of the efficient
market hypothesis (Alcaniz et al., 2017; Bansal & Khanna, 2013). Moreover, it may also
explain the suggestion by Ţiţan (2015) that a new theoretical model may be necessary
given the pace and level of market and economic changes. Despite the controversy
around the EMH, including the constant debate around the impact of information
availability on IPO pricing, the EMH continue to influence the operations of the modern
financial markets, and the importance of understanding the role of market efficiency and
information availability (Degutis & Novickytė, 2014; Lowry & Schwert, 2004). These
reasons justified the use of EMH as the theoretical framework of this study. The principle
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of market efficiency embedded in the EMH and the documented differences in economic
fundamentals between developed and developing countries including market conditions
may impact IPO underpricing (Liu, Uchida, & Gao, 2014; United Nations-OHRLLS,
2015). In light of these factors, exploring IPO underpricing as a market pricing anomalies
in the context of a small developing economy yielded outcomes that may broaden the
debate and in the process expand the body of empirical evidence on this topic.
In the remaining segments of this literature review, I discussed, from the
perspective of the literature, the independent variables for this study, that is, IPO share
retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO underwriter, followed by the dependent
variable, that is, IPO underpricing. For each variable, the discourse include the definition
and measurement of the variable as well as the relationship with the other variables in
this study. The supporting theoretical and empirical evidence outlined in the literature
provided the context and basis for the discussion.
IPO Share Retention Ratio
The IPO share retention ratio is one of two explanatory variables in this
quantitative correlational study. In this study, share retention represents the block of
shares not available for sale to the public in an IPO but retained by the firm’s internal
stakeholders (Alcaniz, Gomez-Bezares, & Ugarte, 2015; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013).
The related IPO share retention ratio refers to the total number of shares retained in the
firm expressed as a percentage of the total number of shares available (He et al., 2015).
Measurement of the IPO share retention ratio. Shares retention ratio which
refers to the percentage of shares retained by the firms’ insiders, or management equity
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ownership, measures the total shares owned by insiders (i.e., management, owners, and
directors) compared to the total number of shares outstanding before the IPO (He et al.,
2015). The use of this ratio occurred frequently in the literature.
IPO retention ratio = [ # of shares O/S - shares offered in IPO ÷ # of shares O/S] x 100
where O/S means outstanding
In Jamaica, there is a 20% minimum level of shares that must be made available
to the public in an IPO (JSE, 2009). However, cultural norms such as the fear of
relinquishing company controlmay increase the tendency for companies in Jamaica,
especially smaller companies to treat this minimum as their maximum (JSE, 2018). It is
possible that some of these procedurals differences may impact the level of shares
retained and hence IPO underpricing in Jamaica. Accordingly, this study may add to the
discussion on the impact of IPO share retention ratio on IPO underpricing.
Share retention as a signal. Leland and Pyle (1977) were the first to introduce
the argument that the shares retained by a firm act as a signal of IPO quality and firm
value. According to the signaling theory, the business owner has information about a
project or firm that can ascribe a specific value to the project or firm slated for financing,
but the principals of the firm has no reliable means of communicating this value to
prospective investors who, according to the EMH will use their subjective probability
distribution to value the project or firm (Katti & Phani, 2016; Leland & Pyle, 1977).
Leland and Pyle suggested that if potential shareholders believe it is in the best interest of
the business owner to be honest about the value of the project or firm, these investors will
respond positively to an entrepreneur’s signal regarding the project or firm value.
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Applying calculus, Leland and Pyle applied their theoretical model to introduce the
concept that the percentage of shares retained in the project or firm by the business owner
is a noiseless signal, perceived by investors as an indication of the true project or firm
value. Therefore, the issuer’s willingness to invest in their firm's equity serves is a signal
to the market of project or firm quality value, and without this signal of quality, the
average return on the project or firm’s stock may be low (Leland & Pyle, 1977).
The implication of Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling model is that potential
investors view retention of shares by internal stakeholders as a valuable signal such that a
decrease/increase in the proportion of shares retained would constitute a negative/positive
signal for the market. Chen and Yang, (2013) suggested that the signaling theory offers
little guidance on what the relationship should be between underpricing and managerial
ownership, and therefore argued that this relationship is an empirical issue. The signaling
model put forward by Leland and Pyle laid the foundation, for the discussion of the
empirical research on IPO share retention ratio as a signal to potential investors and as
one of the drivers of IPO underpricing.
Kumar (2017) investigated the relationship between share retention and
underpricing in the Indian market. Using the standard t-test for equality of means and the
F-test for overall significance as benchmarks, Kumar concluded, from the examination of
112 service sector IPOs issued in the Indian market, that a positive relationship exists
between share retention and underpricing. The findings of Jiang et al. (2015) contradicted
those of Kumar, indicating a negative relationship between the number of shares retained
by an IPO issuer and level of underpricing. Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) agreed that the
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shares retained by insiders reduce information asymmetry by signaling quality to
potential investors. Higher share retention by the internal stakeholders also aligns the
interests of managers with those of external shareholders demonstrating the convergence
of interest effect (Chen & Yang, 2013) and in the process reduces the possibility of
principal-agency conflicts (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Djerbi & Anis, 2015).
The availability of information to the market, as reflected by the sale of shares or
the reputation of the underwriter, impacts the first-day return and suggests lower
information asymmetry, improved market efficiency, and less underpricing for firms that
disclose more information about the IPO to the public (Chhabra, Kiran, & Sah, 2017;
Fama, 1970). Miloud (2014) suggested that company insiders retaining a significant
equity position in the company is indicative, from the investors’ perspective, of the IPO
quality because internal stakeholders of high-quality companies would retain a relatively
high equity stake in their company. Miloud’s model implied that underpricing is not
necessary to induce the investors to participate in an IPO issue because they can infer
firm value and IPO quality from the share retention signal and that there is an inverse
relationship between the share retention ratio and IPO underpricing. The study of the
interaction of share retention and IPO underpricing in Jamaica may help to assess
congruence to or divergence from this model.
Share retention and IPO underpricing. Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) used the
premise elucidated by Leland and Pyle (1977) to build the hypothesis around ownership
structure. Accordingly, Darmadi and Gunawan hypothesized that a higher fraction of
shares retained by insiders (i.e., ownership concentration) should lead to greater
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underpricing. Darmadi and Gunawan applied cross-sectional regressions to 101 firms that
issued IPOs in Indonesia's primary equity market between January 2003 and July 2011,
mapping underpricing as the dependent variable to four explanatory variables and
selected control variables. According to Bernerth, Cole, Taylor, and Walker (2017),
control variables help improve the accuracy of estimates of the relationships among
variables and remove some of the distortions, noise, and contamination that may surface
in the analyses. Control variables may also enhance the accuracy of the estimates of
relationships among variables, improve conservativeness of the hypotheses tests, or
reduce the possibility of spurious explanations of the empirical findings (Becker, et al.,
2016).
The findings from Darmadi and Gunawan’s (2013) research did not support the
hypothesis and indicated that ownership concentration is not significantly related to
underpricing (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013). Gumanti et al. (2017) found similar
insignificant results when they investigated 290 IPOs that went public between 1989 and
2005 in the Indonesian market. Gumanti et al. found a negative, insignificant relationship
between the shares retained and the level of underpricing. The outcomes from these
studies contradicted Leland and Pyle’s original conclusion and implied that potential
investors might not see share retention by insiders as an indicator of the IPO firm’s
quality. Darmadi and Gunawan speculated that Indonesia’s special market conditions of
low proportions of shares offered to the public with often no change in ownership/control
of the IPO firm impacted the results. The Jamaica IPO market operates under similar
conditions as that of Indonesia in relation to the low proportion of IPO shares offered to
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the market, and therefore the outcomes of this study may provide insights comparative
with those of Darmadi and Gunawan.
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) also explored whether share retention for familyowned businesses provided any unique signals to investors. The results from their
investigation indicated that the IPO firm's share retention ratio seems not to signal firm
quality to investors nor reduce the level of information asymmetry (Darmadi &
Gunawan, 2013). Signori, Kotlar, De Massis, and Vismara (2015) found that retaining
control was more important to family owners than economic wealth and hence owners of
family businesses tended to willingly accept IPO underpricing. Signori et al. investigated
1,743 IPOs issues from 1995 to 2011 across seven European counties. Mousa, Ritchie,
and Reed (2014) found a negative relationship between founder-CEO board involvement
and IPO value when they examined 123 high-tech firms that went public from 2001 to
2005. Accordingly, Mousa et al. interpreted this negative relationship to mean that
investors viewed the dominance of founders as a negative signal. The information that
many Jamaican IPO firms tend to offer only the minimum number of shares to the market
may raise similar concerns among investors.
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) also examined share retention for publicly listed
state-owned enterprises and found that the protracted corporatization process that occurs
before an IPO implies effective corporate governance practices, strong firm performance,
and appeared to signal IPO quality to investors but led to greater underpricing. Salama
and Khalifa (2014) found for Egyptian state-owned companies, a significant relationship
between offer ratio, (i.e., the inverse of share retention ratio), and the initial returns,

33
which were significantly different from the market average. The results indicated that
underpricing was a signal to attract market players to invest in the IPO (Salama &
Khalifa, 2014).
Alcaniz et al. (2015) explored whether low levels of retained ownership meant
that the firm must compensate for this negative signal by disclosing more information in
the IPO prospectus. Alcaniz et al. applied linear and non-linear regressions to a sample of
56 Spain-based companies that issued IPOs during the period 1996 and 2007 and found
support for their prediction of a significant negative relationship between the percentage
of shares retained and the level of information disclosed. The results implied that firms
often try to correct any negative signal communicated to the market by low share
retention (i.e., below 50%) with an increased level of information disclosure especially
non-financial (Alcaniz et al., 2015). In summary, the empirical evidence seems to suggest
that the higher the percentage of shares retained by the previous owner(s) the more
impactful the signal to the market (see Hidayat & Kusumastuti, 2014).
The high-quality signal emanating from a high-retention ratio is justified because
owners of a good company would be reluctant to effectively transfer a large proportion of
the future cash flows to an outside investor by lowering their current shareholding
(Miloud, 2014). Firms are therefore, willing to underprice to generate excess demand and
ensure broad-based distribution of the shares among many small shareholders instead of
concentrated ownership in the hands of any single external shareholder who could
challenge the management (Miloud, 2014). Within this context, Miloud’s (2014) model
explored whether dispersed ownership increases with IPO underpricing by analyzing
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approximately 798 IPOs issued on the Paris Stock Exchange from January 1995 to
December 2008. The findings revealed a negative relationship between underpricing and
the number of shareholders (i.e., dispersed shareholdings) suggesting that a high degree
of underpricing correlates to an increased ownership concentration (Miloud, 2014). This
outcome combined with the findings regarding the relationship between shares retained,
liquidity, and trading activities led Miloud to conclude that French investors may not
interpret the share retention signal from pre-IPO owners as worth contemplating.
Miloud’s findings contradicted that of Leland and Pyle (1977) but aligned with those of
Chen and Yang’s (2013) China-based study and Darmadi and Gunawan’s (2013) research
in the Indonesian market. Retention of ownership is also an important factor for Jamaican
IPO firms and the average share retention ratio may supports this claim.
Deb’s (2014) research probed whether the proportion of the IPO shares retained
by the firm’s insiders and the IPO issue price communicate to investors privately held
information such as the fundamental value of the firm. Share retention by external and
internal directors provides a strong signal of firm quality and enhances the credibility of
the IPO firm (Deb, 2014). The directors’ inability to sell their shares in the IPO firm until
after the lock-up period supports this perspective (Deb, 2014). Deb hypothesized that
increased equity ownership by both inside and outside directors resulted in lower
underpricing and tested this hypothesis by applying correlation and regression analyses to
a sample of 417 firms that issued IPOs in the U.S. market between 2001 and 2004.
Isolating underpricing as the dependent variable and internal and external directors as
explanatory variables, Deb found evidence that the level of shares retained by directors at
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the time of an IPO is a significant corporate governance signal. Additionally, Deb
indicated that this governance signal addressed the issue of underpricing, and allowed
pre-IPO owners to maximize returns with lower underpricing, and less money left on the
table. The results from Deb’s study were consistent with those of Ammer and AhmadZaluki (2015), who investigated 190 companies that issued IPOs in the Malaysian market
between 2002 and 2012 and found that a negative relationship existed between
management ownership and IPO underpricing. The general indication from these studies
is that shares retained by the firm impact the level of underpricing of the IPO issue, thus
increasing the relevance of this which also explored the impact of share retention on IPO
underpricing.
However, the outcomes from the research of Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2015)
run counter to those of Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) who did not find any significant
relationship between share ownership and underpricing and Miloud (2014) who
concluded that French investors did not read any signal from share retention. It is
possible that the difference in market and regulatory fundamentals specific to the
geographical jurisdictions of these studies influenced the difference in the outcome and
provided a basis for this study to explore these variables in Jamaica to determine whether
there is support for or opposition to the outcomes.
The Reputation of the IPO Underwriter
Given the complexity of the IPO process and the possible influence that the
underwriter can bring to bear in an IPO negotiation, it is advisable that the IPO firm
engages the support of an underwriter (Cornanic & Novak, 2015; Wu & Wan, 2014). The
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success of an IPO depends heavily on the underwriter’s ability to tell and sell a story
about a bright future for a company with an exceptional business plan and execution
strategy (Wu & Wan, 2014). The underwriter understands that according to Yu and Wen,
(2015) issuer’s demand for capital and investor’s sentiment are essential drivers of offer
volume.
Additionally, the reputation of the underwriter matters because a more prestigious
underwriter brings more reputational capital to the IPO process than the less reputable
underwriter, and IPO firms who engage high-reputation underwriters receive significant
incremental benefits, including higher offer values, (Bangsund, 2014; Fernando, Gatchev,
May, & Megginson, 2015). Dimovski (2015) added that these reputable underwriters are
often not more costly, based on the investigation of 87 Australian A-REIT IPOs issued
from 1994 to 2013. Underpricing increases the overall cost of the issue (Rubalcava,
2016), and while cost is a significant factor for firms especially for SMEs, in may be
worth it to acquire the underwriting/brokerage services of a prestigious investment bank.
This argument that the underwriter’s reputation brings value to the IPO process supports
the inclusion of underwriter reputation as one of the independent variable in this study.
The role of the underwriter. The IPO underwriter plays the critical role of
providing reliable information to potential investors (Adriani, Deidda, & Sonderegger,
2014). The underwriter also supports the firm in other essential roles such as validation
which signals to investors the status of the business and is the primary focus of the
certification theories initiated by Logue (1973), price stabilizer (Deb, 2014; Mazouz et
al., 2013), and liquidity provider (Deb, 2014). While the IPO can build off a firm’s
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visibility and notoriety (Batnini, & Hammami, 2015), the underwriter’s reputation also
signals to investors the strength of a firm by certifying the quality of and adding
credibility to IPOs, especially for young firms (Bangsund, 2014; He et al., 2015). Further,
the reputable underwriter can ease the uncertainty associated with the asymmetric
information between IPO issuers and investors, moderate the perception by investors of
issuer dominance (He et al., 2015), and help to nullify the firm’s risk of newness to the
market (He et al., 2015; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015; Wu & Wan, 2014).
Additionally, Bangsund (2014) indicated that the reputable underwriter also
signals the quality and effective pricing of the IPO, that is, the price reflect the value of
the stock, which supports the tenets of the EMH. The underwriters execute their various
roles by capitalizing on their extensive contact network to push demand and thereby
helping the firm to successfully achieve its funding objectives (He et al., 2015; Wu &
Wan, 2014). According to He et al. (2015), there is sufficient research to support the
position that underwriters must straddle the competing interests of the issuer and the
investor. The issuer would prefer a higher price to maximize IPO proceeds and minimize
money left on the table, while the investor would like to optimize short-term gains
(Mazouz et al., 2013; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015). Serving the interest of the issuer is an
imperative for the underwriter because higher IPO proceeds mean higher underwriting
fees and greater access to future IPOs and SEOs, given that companies’ behavior relating
to underwriting of issues tends to be repetitive (Cao et al., 2015).
Similarly, the underwriter must also ensure that the investors’ interest gain the
significnace it requires even at the expense of lower underwriting fees in the current
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period (He et al., 2015; Wu, 2014). Accordingly, satisfying the investors increases
underwriter reputation among their clientele, generates demand, increases the probability
of the IPO success, carves out a loyal set of potential investors, and lowers the amount of
effort needed to underwrite current and future IPOs (He et al., 2015; Wu, 2014). Even
though underwriters’ roles and behaviors tend to be universal across borders, there are
instances in Jamaica when IPO firms do not employ the formal underwriting services but
retain an investment bank for advisory and brokerage services (JSE, 2018). Omitting the
formal underwriting process may impact the role underwriters play in supporting IPOs in
Jamaica and as such this study may expand the discussion on the role of the underwriter
in the IPO process and the relationship with IPO underpricing.
Measuring underwriter reputation. The IPO literature provides various proxies
used by researchers to measure the reputation of the IPO underwriter. Wu and Wan
(2014) defined underwriting activities in terms of dollar value in the official currency of
the research location or volume that is, the number of IPOs underwritten and or the
frequency. These measures, derived from IPO activities underwritten over time, are
appropriate given that reputation typically improves over time and depends on past
successes (Wu & Wan, 2014). Market share is the most common measure of underwriter
reputation and provides indicative information on the quality of the underwriter
(Bangsund, 2014). In 2015, Jeribi introduced a multi-dimensional measure in the
Tunisian market and ranked underwriters accordingly. Jeribi’s (2015) approach for
measuring underwriter reputation involved the use of a composite of measures adopted
by previous researchers. Jeribi augmented the traditional measures including those
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introduced by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Megginson–Weiss (1991) with additions
such as including the number of IPO shares requested by each underwriter relative to the
total shares, the underwriter’s capital, the size of the IPO issue for underwriting as well as
the underwriter’s turnover and age.
The two most frequently used methods outlined in the literature for measuring the
reputation of the IPO underwriter are Megginson–Weiss (MW) (1991) and Carter and
Manaster (CM) (199), sometimes used in the updated/modified or extended forms.
Loughran and Ritter (2004) amended the CM measure ranking system to account for
IPOs led by penny stock underwriters and range from a low of 1 to 9 (Loughran & Ritter,
2004). The measure for the CM indicator defines the underwriter rankings in tombstone
announcements with ranks ranging in scores from 0.5 to 9 (Carter & Manaster, 1990).
The MW measure estimate the market share of underwriters based on IPOs
underwritten/supported using a range from zero to one hundred (Jeribi, 2015).
There is no universal rule regarding the ranking system adopted by a researcher,
but depends on the preference of the research or can be specific to the research, for
example, Cao et al. (2015) used MW primarily but included the CM to improve the
robustness of the outcomes while, He et al. (2015), Deb (2014), and Reutzel and Belsito,
(2015) followed only the CM measurement approach. Other studies adopted
country/region specific measures depending on the geographical scope of their research;
for example, (a) Wu and Wan (2014) measured underwriter reputation using the ranking
system of the Securities Association of China for their China-specific study, and (b)
Indriani and Marlia’s (2015) applied the ranking from the Indonesian Stock Exchange
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(IDX) to study underwriter reputation in Indonesia. Other researchers opted to collect and
analyze market information such as Mazouz et al. (2013) who studied Hong Kong.
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) used for their research on Indonesia globally recognized
sources such as the Bloomberg ranking. The information in the literature indicated that
the method adopted to measure underwriter reputation is decided by the researcher, and
the adoption a country-specific approach to measure underwriter reputation in this study
has precedence in the literature.
Underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. Implicit in the findings of
Beatty and Ritter (1986) is the position that effective pricing is an primary deliverable for
the underwriter. According to Wu and Wan (2014), excessive underpricing or overpricing
by the underwriter leads to loss of credibility in the market, impaired reputation and may
lead to loss of investors, issuers, and income. In contrast, having a track record of
effective pricing builds an enviable reputation that can translate to successful IPOs and
increased income for the underwriter (Wu & Wan, 2014).
The literature includes extensive empirical studies on the relationship between
underwriter reputation, asymmetry information, and IPO underpricing with diverse
outcomes and conclusions. Results exist to support both the presence (positive and
negative) and absence of a significant relationship among these variables. First, the
central premise of the certification theories as enunciated by Booth and Smith (1986),
Carter and Manaster (1990), and Logue (1973) is that a negative relationship exists
between underwriter reputation and underpricing and that the underwriter’s certification
role reduces the need for underpricing. Subsequent research works which support this
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position include Darmadi and Gunawan (2013), who examined the impact of underwriter
reputation on IPO underpricing, board structure, and corporate ownership in 101 firms
that issued IPOs between 2003 and 2011 in the Indonesian market.
Indriani and Marlia’s (2015) also found evidence to substantiate their prediction
of significant correlation between underwriter reputation and underpricing. After testing a
sample of 72 firms that issued underpriced IPOs in the Indonesian market during that
period 2009 and 2013, Indriani and Marlia concurred with the theories of certification
models. Gumanti, Nurhayati, and Maulidia, (2015) found a significant negative
relationship between the reputation of underwriters and IPO underpricing supporting the
argument that reputable underwriters could lead to lower underpricing. Indriani and
Marlia’s work was specific to Indonesia where they found that underpricing averaged
27.22% and this outcome is similar to that of Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) and Gumanti
et al. who conducted research in the same market, but higher than the level of
underpricing found from the U.S. based research of Deb’s (2014) and Ritter’s (2015).
He et al. (2015) concurred with the certification theories that a prestigious
underwriter, because of their market expertise, the ability to screen quality IPO firms, and
IPO track record will add credibility and provide certification value to an IPO issue,
especially for newer firms. From their analyses of 1,071 firms, He et al. found that
underwriter reputation reduces the length of the lockup period. This reduction in the
lockup period was due to the certification effect which mitigates information asymmetry
that encapsulates the investors' concerns about their exposure to the actions of internal
pre-IPO owners (He et al., 2015). The implication, borne out by the results of the study
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by He et al. that underwriter reputation reduces the need for underpricing, has repeated
support from other researchers including Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) and Gumanti et
al. (2015). The results of all these studies provided sufficient evidence that underwriter
reputation impacts the level of underpricing and as such the outcome from this study
which examined underwriter reputation as a driver of underpricing, can expand the
existing body of literature.
In contrast, there is equally strong evidence to challenge the arguments put
forward by the certification theorists that underwriter reputation reduces the level of
underpricing. Song, Tan, and Yang (2014) found in their investigation of 948 Chinese
IPO firms a positive relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing while
Wu and Wan, (2014) found no significant correlation between underwriter reputation and
underpricing even after adjusting for market impact. The research outcome indicated that
underwriter reputation does not contribute to the narrowing of the variance between the
issuing price and the first-day closing price, and from the investors’ perspective,
underwriters’ pricing actions do not convey the information they need about the intrinsic
value of the stock (Wu & Wan, 2014).
The findings from the study by Wu and Wan (2014) seem to align to the position
of Johnson and Miller (1988) who questioned why is it that all investors did not gravitate
only to the IPOs represented by reputable underwriters if a link between IPO pricing and
underwriter reputation. Johnson and Miller built their model on the supposition that there
is market segmentation based on the fundamental risk of the IPO and that reputable
underwriters represent IPOs in the less risky market segment. The outcome of the
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analyses from Johnson and Miller indicated that when risk-adjusted returns proxied IPO
performance, no statistically significant relationship exists between underpricing and
underwriter reputation. Deb (2014) also found support for Johnson and Miller’s position
when he examined underwriter reputation, underpricing ownership, and liquidity as the
model’s control variables. An analysis conducted on a sample of 417 firms that issued
IPOs in the United States from 2001 to 2004 did not support the findings of the
certification theorists as underwriter reputation did not have a statistically significant
impact on underpricing (Deb, 2014). The literature also provided evidence that indicates
no any significant impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing, thereby
broadening the debate, supporting the lack of consensus and the increasing relevance of
the contents of this study that examined underwriter reputation as one of the predictors of
underpricing.
However, there was evidence to suggest that reputable underwriters not only
certify IPOs, as outlined by the early certification theorists such as Booth and Smith
(1986) but also act as a stabilizer, a position supported by Mazouz et al. (2013). Mazouz
et al.’s (2013) empirical study on the role of the underwriter as a price stabilizer involved
115 IPOs issued on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between April 2003 and June 2010
and subsequently went through the stabilization process. Stabilization means the
underwriter stays in the post IPO market to support the prices of and thereby bolster
demand for IPOs for newly issued stocks (Mazouz et al., 2013). Mazouz et al. found that
stabilized IPOs were more common among reputable underwriters and experienced less
underpricing than other IPOs. Moreover, Mazouz et al. believe that through the act of
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stabilization, underwriters may also help to increase the proceeds accruing to issuers by
reducing the total money left on the table and in the process boosts the income and
reputation of the underwriters. Jeribi et al. (2014) found in their study of 33 IPOs issued
from 1994 to 2012 in the principal and alternate Tunisian stock markets that reputable
underwriters supported their IPOs during the first four weeks more than the low
reputation underwriters. The literature on IPO includes the stabilization role of the
underwriter and while this aspect of their role in the IPO process may be beyond the
scope of this study, it presents another option for further research.
The average return on the stocks supported by reputable underwriters was
25.75%, more than four times higher than that of the low reputation underwriters (Jeribi
et al., 2014). Bédard, Coulombe, and Courteau (2016) found that the underwriter
associated with the IPO issue acted as a substitute for earnings forecast in the prospectus
and resulted in reduced underpricing among non-forecasting firms. The results from
Bédard et al.’s application of multiple regression analysis and Pearson correlation
coefficient to 244 IPOs issued in Quebec over the period 1982 to 2002, provided
evidence of a significant negative relationship between the quality coefficient (in which
they incorporated underwriter reputation) and underpricing. Counter to their hypothesis
that a negative correlation exists between underwriter’s market share and IPO
underpricing, Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki, (2015), found a positive but insignificant
relationship. Reputable underwriters, as indicated by higher market share, resulted in
increased underpricing which averaged 21.22% (Ammer & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2015). This
level of underpricing was lower than the 38.16% that Abu Bakar and Uzaki (2013) found
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in the same country but among 420 Malaysian companies compliant with Islamic laws.
The findings of Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki were at odds with those of the early
certification theorists such as Booth and Smith (1986) but collaborated those of Loughran
and Ritter (2004). The increased IPO underpricing that researchers found to be associated
with high-reputation underwriters is an important area of investigation in this study.
Similar to Deb (2014), He et al. (2015) explored underwriter reputation as one of
the minor factors in a model that focused on the lockup period and underpricing. The
lockup period, typically defined as the period of 180 days occur when the owners of an
IPO company agree not to dispose of their shares following an IPO (He, et al., 2015). The
reputation of the underwriter represents an important positive signal to investors and
reduces investors' concerns and information asymmetry, as well as the length of the
lockup period because their reputation replaces the need for the other signals such longer
lockup periods and underpricing (He et al., 2015). Chipeta and Jardine (2014) suggested
that the use of international investments banks by local firms in the South African IPO
market improved the post-initial market performance of IPOs. The reputation of the
underwriter who supports an IPO signals the market about the quality of the IPO firm and
the examination of this variable as a signal in the Jamaica market will expand the body of
research in this area.
Using a similar approach as that adopted for the discussion of the independent
variables, the remainder of the literature review comprises a detailed discourse on IPO
underpricing, the dependent variable for this study. The principal components of the
discussion include the variable definition incorporating the money left on the table

46
argument. Other aspects of the discussion in this final part of the literature review are the
measurement of IPO underpricing, as well as the impact of information asymmetry as
purported by original theorists and supported by subsequent empirical researchers on the
topic.
IPO Underpricing
Described as one of the most puzzling empirical regularities of the IPO market, IPO
underpricing is a pervasive phenomenon (Asiri & Haji, 2015; Bacon & Arkorful, 2015;
Cornanic & Novak, 2015). According to the literature, IPO underpricing occurs in a
number of countries (Cornanic & Novak, 2015; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013) persists over
time (Cichello & Lamdin, 2016; Cornanic & Novak, 2015; Gokkaya, Highfield,
Roskelley, & Steele, 2015) and across various periods (Kesten & Mungan, 2015; Leong
& Sundarasen, 2015; Miloud, 2014; Tanda & Anderloni, 2014). Significant first-day
return is also evident across industries (Burrill, 2014; Kumar, 2017), markets (Jeribi et
al., 2014), and robust across measurement models (Miloud, 2014; Reddy, 2015).
According to Deng and Zhou (2016), IPOs are universal but more pronounced in
developing countries such as the Chinese market.
Despite being probed from many angles, this topic continues to sustain the
interest of academicians and market players in the IPO space (Jeribi et al., 2014; Liu &
Forester, 2014). Arguments exist on both sides as to whether IPO underpricing is
beneficial or costly to the business, but Deb (2014) suggested that the positive
implications of underpricing may help to explain why IPO underpricing persists despite
effective internal governance. Given that this study will explore the impact of IPO share
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retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO underwriter on IPO underpricing with a
sample that spans over 30 years, it is possible that the outcome may provide some
insights on the persistence of IPO underpricing in the context of this small island
developing country.
The argument that IPO underpricing remains persistent in an environment of
market efficiency finds support from the outcome of Gehrig and Fohlin’s (2006)
research. Gehrig and Fohlin found evidence of market inefficiency and IPO underpricing
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when they analyzed 408 multi-sector stocks
which traded on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910. Their
research revealed that despite the presence of informational inefficiency and adverse
selection costs, both these variables improved over the research period implying some
applicability of the EMH. IPO underpricing not only persists over time as indicated
earlier, but high initial returns also lingered beyond the immediacy of the first day of
trading, as indicated by Reilly and Hatfield (1969) who investigated 53 IPOs issued
across two periods, December 1963 to August 1964 and January 1965 to June 1965.
Reilly and Hatfield compared the changes in market price to the indices of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DWIA) and the Over the Counter Industrial Average (OTC) and
found strong support for the hypothesis that IPOs outperform the market in both the short
and long term. The market and firm-specific risks that the investor assumes because of
the unseasoned nature of an IPO may be the reason for the strong returns relative to the
market (Reilly & Hatfield, 1969).
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Similarly, the argument that IPO underpricing is protracted also found support
from the literature. Tanda and Anderloni (2014), who studied 103 European companies
from the life science industries that issued IPOs from 2002 to 2007 across multiples
countries in Europe, indicated that high initial returns often extend beyond the first day of
trading averaging approximately 12% on day one and 17% a week after. Based on their
research of 75 IPOs issued on the Karachi Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2011, Mumtaz
and Ahmed (2014) found average underpricing of 30.3% on day one and 24.2% on day
13.
Jeribi et al. (2014) studied 33 IPOs issued in the Tunisian market between 1994
and 2012 and found that the high returns on day one for firms that engaged high and low
reputation underwriters extended beyond the one week stated by Tanda and Anderloni
(2014) into week five and three respectively. In contrast, Bansal and Khanna (2013)
found evidence that contradicts these results when they explored underpricing in the
context of a mandatory, regulated IPO grading. The examination by Bansal & Khanna of
168 IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2011 revealed that the
initial first-day return on IPO shares tends not to retain its first-day momentum and often
turn negative by day four. While an in-depth investigation of the performance of the
stock in the long-term is outside the scope of this study, the outcomes can provide
information on day one performance of the stock and suggest long term performance as
an area for future research.
Definition of IPO underpricing. The IPO pricing process is critical but complex
and except for decisions relating to the size of the IPO offer, the share price is the most
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important outcome of the IPO process (Imam & Jaber, 2014; Katti & Phani, 2016; Kesten
& Mungan, 2015). Ganesamoorthy and Shankar (2014) indicated that the market plays a
critical role in the pricing process and the pricing of the company’s share is a function of
the market perception of earnings potential. However, in addition to market dubieties, the
following factors complicate the IPO pricing process: (a) uncertainty around the demand,
(b) time constraints (given the firm's usual urgent need for capital) (c) price inflexibility
(once the firm makes the offer) (d) difference in the issuers versus the investors'
perception of the value of the firm (Katti & Phani, 2016) (e) market newness of the IPO
firm (Handa & Singh, 2014; Imam & Jaber, 2014) (f) relatively high degree of volatility
and riskiness of the new firm (Peterle & Berk, 2016), and (g) balancing the interests of
the issuers and the investors (Tamm & Varma, 2014).
From the perspective of Imam and Jaber (2014), the liability of market newness
makes pricing an IPO close to its projected market value difficult because the market
price of a stock is a risk-return relationship driven by company fundamentals. Unlike a
traded company, the IPO firm is often unknown to investors and lacks the track records
and history that can substantiate the quality of the issue and justify the firm’s potential,
resulting in information asymmetry between the internal stakeholders and the investors
(Handa & Singh, 2014; Imam & Jaber, 2014; Peterle & Berk, 2016). This scenario
implies that the EMH principle, which states that the stock prices reflect available
information, may not be evident for these new firms because the market analysts lack the
data to define the risk-return relationship that would guide the pricing process (Imam &
Jaber, 2014). However, for many IPOs, the market assumes that underwriters tend to
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price the stocks conservatively resulting in stock price appreciation on the first day of
trading (Christofi, Bailey, & Carroll, 2015). Many of the IPO firms in the sample for this
study are new companies to the market and for which information asymmetry exists
between investors and issuers and the IPO offer price does not reflect available
information as assumed by the EMH.
The outcome of the pricing process relative to the first day of trading occurs in
one of three forms. First, a negative initial return also referred to as overpricing (Asiri &
Haji, 2015; Leong & Sundarasen, 2015; Liu & Forester, 2014), occurs when the first-day
market price is below the initial offer price, resulting in potential loss to the investors.
Second, pricing efficiency occurs when the initial market return is close to or equal to
zero because the offer price is the same as or close to the price on the first day of trading
(Almeida & Leal, 2015). Finally, when the market price on day one of trading is higher
than the offer price it generates a positive initial market return to the investor and this
denotes underpricing (Bateni & Asghari, 2014; Leong & Sundarasen, 2015; Peterle &
Berk, 2016).
Alternatively, underpricing exists where the underwriters’ action aligns to the
expectations of potential investors by pricing the IPO shares below the perceived market
value of the firm (Gulati, Bose, & Roy, 2017). Keef, Keefe, and Khaled (2015) suggested
that this third scenario where a positive first-day return occurs (i.e., underpricing) is
typically the case. Degutis and Novickytė (2014) raised concerns about the empirical
significance and soundness of the EMH in the context of pricing anomalies where market
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prices often do not align to the intrinsic value of the stock, such as in instances of
underpricing.
Pricing an IPO requires the underwriter to balance the interests of both issuer and
the investor by minimizing the money left on the table and allowing a positive initial
return respectively (Almeida & Leal, 2015; Tamm & Varma, 2014). However, balancing
the interest of IPO stakeholders is never easy since underpricing is not a zero-sum
practice, because increasing the first-day return to the investor that is, higher
underpricing, translates to lower IPO proceeds accruing to the firm and increases the
amount of money left on the table (Asiri & Haji, 2015). In an IPO, underpricing forms a
part of the firm’s cost structure because underpricing reduces the total IPO proceeds from
the sales of the IPO shares (Husnan, Hanafi, & Munandar, 2014). Underpricing is a
function of the pricing of the IPO, therefore the underpricing outcomes of this study can
indicate the success of the underwriter’s pricing efficiency and the effort at balancing the
interest of the issuer and the investor.
Money left on the table. Underpricing of a stock that can occur when a firm goes
public implies that the issuer’s preference would be for a higher priced IPO to increase
the issuer’s aggregate proceeds (Asiri & Haji, 2015; Ritter, 2015). However, pricing
below the subsequent first-day market price reduces the average intake per share and
leaves money on the table (Cornanic & Novak, 2015; Handa & Singh, 2014; Kesten &
Mungan, 2015). In formulaic terms, Thompson (2016) defined money left on the table
(MLOT) as absolute underpricing (i.e., the difference between the first-day market price
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and the initial offer price) multiplied by the number of shares offered. This definition
aligns to formulaic representation depicted by Wong et al. (2014) that is,
MLOT = (absolute underpricing per stock) x (# of offer shares)
where absolute underpricing per share = Day 1 closing price - offer price
Firms go public to maximize the total proceeds from the IPO (Bahadir et al.,
2015). For this reason, underpricing and its impact on investment capabilities and growth
opportunities are areas of concern for issuers (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Wu, 2014). Total
money left on the table from 8,253 IPOs issued from 1980 to 2016 in the United States
was $155.16 billion, with an estimated average of $18.80M for each firm that issued an
IPO during this period (see Ritter, 2017). Jeppsson (2016) indicated that underpricing
averaged 17.5% among venture-backed biotechnology IPOs issued from 1980 to 2015,
and this resulted in a total of $6.3 billion in IPO proceeds left on the table. Despite the
related costs and potential impact on growth opportunities of leaving money on the table,
supporters of the principal-agency theory suggest that for internal stakeholders, it may be
a worthwhile sacrifice to align the interests of the underwriters to that of the firm (Wu,
2014). Nevertheless, aligning the interest of the principal with that of the agent can be
expensive and issuers may become insensitive to the amount of IPO proceeds left on the
table and the impact on the firm’s growth prospects because underpricing can help to
increase the personal wealth of the firm’s internal stakeholders (Kultys, 2016; Thompson,
2016). In small developing countries where funding can be a significant challenge
(Acharya, 2014), understanding that leaving money on the table in an IPO can impact
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growth and development may help executives in Jamaica to have more informed
discussions with their underwriters about IPO objectives.
Measurement of IPO underpricing. IPO underpricing represents the difference
between the IPO’s offer price and the closing market price on the first day of trading
(Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Leong & Sundarasen, 2015). Typically measured in percentage
format, IPO underpricing is the difference between what investors will pay and what the
issuers expect them to pay expressed as the average first-day initial return on the IPO
stock (Donnelly & Hajbaba, 2014; Reddy, 2015; Shen, Coakley, & Instefjord, 2014;
Wong et al., 2014). That is,
%

=[

−

÷

] 100%

OR
% IRi = [

÷

− 1] × 100%

where IRi = initial return or underpricing
CPi = closing price of the ith stock on the first day of trading
OPi = offer price for the ith stock
IPO underpricing and information asymmetry. Early researchers such as
Baron (1982), Rock (1986), and Welch (1989) hypothesized and tested information
asymmetry as a determinant of IPO underpricing. Katti and Phani (2016) added that the
level of information disparity differs among various groups of IPO players and to varying
degrees. This information divergence can lead to variation in the perceived price of the
IPO share and implied firm value (Katti & Phani, 2016). The information variance in the
perceived price means that one party has more or better information than the other which
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can create an imbalance of power that fosters opportunistic behavior (Hull et al., 2016;
Miloud, 2014).
Relative to the issuer and the underwriter, potential IPO investors have
incomplete information about the company’s fundamentals and must, therefore, mitigate
the associated risks by demanding a reduced offer price as a motivation to participate in
the IPO issue (Fleischer & Staudt, 2014; Imam & Jaber, 2014). According to Katti and
Phani (2016), the level of the underpricing that must occur to induce investors is a
function of the degree of difficulty faced by the issuer in determining the information gap
among various categories of investors. To stimulate demand, ensure a successful issue in
the context of information asymmetry, and to entice the investors back to the market, IPO
firms, and underwriter may intentionally price the IPO such that underpricing occurs
(Katti & Phani, 2016).
Despite the various studies that support the theory that information asymmetry
helps to explain the degree of underpricing, some researchers believed other factors could
impact IPO performance and underpricing. For example, Katti and Phani (2016) argued
that firm-specific and market-specific factors could drive underpricing and countryspecific factors may impact underpricing given the various levels of underpricing across
geographical borders (see Ritter (2017). Many of the signals to investors are from IPO
firms but exogenous factors can also influence investor behavior (Dolvin & Fernhaber,
2014). Tupper (2016) found in research of 562 firms (including firms with founder-CEOs
and firms with foreign origins) that went public from 2005 to 2010, that the ecosystems
operative during the IPO issue impact how the market accepts selected firm-specific
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features, implying that the environment existing at the time of an IPO may influence the
IPO’s performance. In light of this, understanding IPO underpricing and the relationship
with IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO underwriter within the
context of the unique fundamentals of this small developing country (see United NationsOHRLLS, 2015), may help to expand the body of literature on this topic.
According to Husnan et al. (2014), it is difficult to understand the deliberate
underpricing of an IPO issue given that underpricing leaves money on the table and
contravenes the firm’s objective of maximizing IPO proceeds. The remainder of this
literature review may help to address this question and starts with an overview of the
foundation theories. The literature review also contains the role and impact of
information asymmetry in explaining the relationship between independent and
dependent variables adopted for this study, that is, IPO share retention ratio, reputation of
the IPO underwriter, and IPO underpricing. Specifically, this component of the literature
review includes the following theories (a) Baron’s (1982) principal-agency, (b) Rock’s
(1986) winner’s curse, (c) Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling theories, and (d)
underwriter-based certification models initiated by Logue (1973) and other researchers.
Wu (2014) highlighted several non-asymmetric information theories such as dynamic
information acquisition theory and informational cascades theory. However, these
theories are outside the scope of this study.
Principal-agency problem. The narrative surrounding the principal-agency theory
builds on the premise that the acquisition of personal wealth, self-interest, and selfcenteredness are the primary motivators of individuals (Dorsey, 2014). According to the
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principal-agency theory, collaborative parties in this arrangement have varying and
sometimes competing goals: the principal (who delegates the tasks) employs the agent
(who executes the tasks) to act on their behalf (Bernstein, Buse, & Bilimoria, 2016;
Dorsey, 2014). The agents’ actions in their own best interest may create information
asymmetry (Bernstein et al., 2016) therefore though expensive, inducements to align the
interest of the agent to that of the principal are necessary to ensure that the principal’s
goals do not become subservient to those of the agent (Dorsey, 2014; Kultys, 2016).
Quality corporate governance through ownership dispersion can assist the separation of
ownership and managerial control issues, but the use of stock options to compensate an
executive management team is one way to achieve alignment of objectives and resolve
potential principal-agency conflicts in companies (Long, 2016; Shen & Gentry, 2014).
The IPO issuer can also achieve this alignment by engaging the underwriter in a firm
commitment contract in which the underwriter guarantees to the issuer an agreed amount
of IPO proceeds (Chen & Wu, 2015).
Baron (1982) modelled the principal-agency principle to explain the underpricing
by arguing that in the IPO environment, a countervailing force exists between issuing
firms (the principal) and underwriters (the agent). There is information asymmetry
between the issuer and the underwriter, and the information advantage resides with the
underwriter especially relating market conditions for potential demand for the new shares
(Katti & Phani, 2016; Wu, 2014). The underwriter capitalizes on this information
advantage and related influence on the IPO pricing/selling process by adjusting the price
to ensure that the level of underpricing encourages both current and future demand with
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minimum efforts (Wu, 2014). The underwriter achieves this objective, however, at the
expense of benefits to the issuers such as higher proceeds accruing to the firm (Katti &
Phani, 2016).
While the primary objective of the issuer is to maximize expected return on the
IPO, this objective may diverge from that of the underwriter, which is to deliberately
underprice the issue to support distribution and boost demand (Katti & Phani, 2016; Wu,
2014). From the issuer’s perspective, maximizing the expected proceeds, reducing money
left on the table, and improving the capacity of the firm to achieve its growth objectives
mean pricing the issue at the highest level possible for the market to absorb (Miloud,
2014). However, the issuer has less information on pricing, demand, and distribution and
may have to concede to underpriced shares as an incentive for the underwriter who
believe that underpricing the issue will increase the demand for current and future issues
and minimize possible underwriting losses (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Katti & Phani,
2016). Thus underpricing move may be necessary to align the interest of the underwriter
to that of the issuer (Baron, 1982).
Even though both the issuer and the underwriter sacrifice gains when
underpricing occurs (Bernstein et al., 2016), Wu (2014) indicated that they also benefit
from underpricing an IPO. Although underwriters will receive lower underwriting fees as
a result of the underpricing, they will secure future fees from the success of future IPO
issues by engendering the loyalty of their regular customers with strong initial returns in
the current period (Wu, 2014). Similarly, underpricing may appear to be detrimental to
issuers given concerns about leaving money on the table, but the higher sales volume
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associated with the underpriced shares may increase the total proceeds accruing to the
issuer (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Wu, 2014).
Baron’s (1982) theory is not without contradictions and controversy. First, Beatty
and Ritter (1986) found evidence to support a significant relationship between the
underwriter's intermediary process and information asymmetry. Beatty and Ritter
researched 1,028 U.S. IPOs issued from 1977 to 1982 and found that the issuer was
aware of the presence of information asymmetry and that the underwriter induced the
degree of underpricing. The findings of the study by Regalli and Soana (2013) supported
the outcomes of Baron’s (1982). Regalli and Soana applied a logit regression model and
descriptive statistics to 213 Italian-issued bank IPOs in Italy between 1985 and 2007 and
concluded that their findings appear to be consistent with Baron’s hypothesis and that this
theory may help to explain underpricing in Italy.
By contrast, Muscarella and Vetsuypens' (1989) examined the validity of Baron’s
theory in the U.S. market by investigating IPOs of 38 investment banks that went public
in the period 1970–1987 under the assumption of information asymmetry between issuers
and underwriters. The IPOs issued by these investment banks were self-underwritten,
suggesting that the issuer is also the informed underwriter (Muscarella & Vetsuypens,
1989). The results from Muscarella and Vetsuypens' study did not support the hypothesis
or the results of Baron's model and indicated that these self-underwritten IPOs
experienced statistically significant underpricing relative to the IPOs of the other
companies.
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Using a more comprehensive research design, Cheung and Krinsky (1994) tested
Baron’s model on all Canadian investment bankers that went public on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSE) between 1982 and 1988. However, unlike Muscarella and Vetsuypens
who applied Baron’s model to only IPOs of investment bankers, Cheung and Krinsky
compared the price behavior of IPOs of both investment bankers and comparable
noninvestment bankers. Their outcomes were similar to those of Muscarella and
Vetsuypens and contradicted the implication of Baron’s theory that is, cases where the
issuer is also an informed investment banker, there should be no underpricing.
However, the critique of the principal-agency theory includes more than just the
empirical testing and validation of Baron’s (1982) model. For example, Kultys (2016) in
his theoretical framework suggested that the simplistic premises which underpin the
principal-agency theory (a) underestimate the actions and relationships between market
players, (b) have limited applicability, and (c) are not sufficient to adequately describe
the complexities of human behavior. Additionally, Kultys, (2016) suggested other factors
that IPO issuers should consider including control mechanisms required to align the
interest of the principal with that of the agent (a) can be expensive and (b) may also cause
legal and ownership complications that can impact the operations of the IPO company.
For example, agreeing to underprice to align the interest of the underwriter to that of the
firm can rob the firm of growth opportunities because of the money left on the table (Wu,
2014).
Finally, Bendickson, Muldoon, Liguori, and Davis (2016) argued that the
principal-agency theory is a function of its time and does not address (a) the socially
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embedded issues associated with the family firm, (b) changes in the economy and
technology which educate stakeholders, such as employees, and (c) modern phenomena
such as social media, which impacts the level and speed of communication. There is the
implication that the estimated 500 million tweets per day from social media-based
Twitters IPO sentiment analysis could provide valuable information to market
stakeholders (Liew & Wang, 2016). While the concerns of Bendickson et al. would apply
in the Jamaican context, given that some IPO issuers especially those trading on JSE
junior market do not engage underwriting services in its purest sense (JSE, 2018), it may
also constrain the applicability of the principal-agency theory as a reasonable explanation
of underpricing within the context of this small developing country.
Winner’s curse theory. Also referred to as the adverse selection theory, Kevin
Rock (1986) presented the winner's curse theory in 1986 on the basis that asymmetric
information exists between two groups of investors. These two groups of investors, called
the informed and the uninformed, have dissimilar roles, but are equally important to the
success of the IPO (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015). These potential investors face varying
degree of information asymmetry which creates heterogeneity of investment objectives
and uncertainty around the firm’s valuation, making increased access to information
critical but costly (Katti & Phani, 2016). According to Katti and Phani (2016), Rock’s
theory essentially assumed convergence in the roles of the issuer and underwriter, thereby
mitigating the possibility of agency conflicts between them.
The first group of investors is the informed investors because of proprietary
knowledge of the expected value of the IPO in the secondary market based on data
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collected and analysed (Miloud, 2014). This group, Katti and Phani (2016) indicated are
primarily institutional investors who can use their economies of scale to acquire the
required information. From this informed position, the investors can reduce the
information asymmetry and gain insights about the quality of the IPO (Bacon & Arkorful,
2015). The other group of investors labelled uninformed, has access only to public
information, and unlike the precision with which the informed investors can assess the
quality of the IPO, this group has only a probability distribution with which to assess IPO
quality, and therefore cannot necessarily determine the best IPOs in which to invest (Katti
& Phani, 2016).
The issuer’s objective is to set an optimal price that will attract the informed
investor by rewarding and compensating these investors for obtaining superior
information and the uninformed investors who tend to invest for longer periods (Katti &
Phani, 2016). Armed with their knowledge about the expected value of the IPO share, the
informed investors will only demand shares from high-quality firms when the offer price
is below the expected market value that is, underpriced (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015). The
uninformed investors, however, do not know the expected value, and therefore cannot
distinguish between overpriced or underpriced issues (Wu, 2014). Hence the uninformed
investors receive a disproportional allocation of poorly performing IPO and the winner’s
curse (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Miloud, 2014). However,
underpricing fosters competition which increases the demand from both groups of
investors resulting in the rationed allocation of the underpriced issues via a fair and
equitable distribution mechanism (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015).
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Researchers who applied empirical testing to Rock's (1986) model include Beatty
and Ritter (1986) who considered, among other things how the informed investors would
identify which IPOs to invest and how the issuer may control the level of underpricing.
Beatty and Ritter who examined 1,082 common stock IPOs issued from 1977 through
1982, under the assumptions that riskier IPOs must disclose more information about the
IPO and larger companies are less risky than smaller companies, found a positive relation
between expected return and ex-ante uncertainty. Beatty and Ritter’s research outcomes
support the principles of the EMH suggesting a positive relationship between returns and
the risk inherent in the issue. Consequently, Beatty and Ritter concluded that investors
would explore IPOs with a high degree of ex-ante risk because of the opportunity to
increase initial first-day returns. Given that the dependent variable in this study is IPO
underpricing, the outcome of this study may indicate the level of underpricing evident in
this small developing economies and possible insights as to the risks associated with the
IPOs issued in the Jamaican market.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) tested Rock’s (1986) model and found support for
their hypotheses that (a) underpricing exists in an environment of asymmetrical
information, (b) information heterogeneity exists among investors, and (c) underpricing is
necessary to attract the uninformed investors back to the market and compensate these
investors for the winner's curse. Using a study period from 1984 to 1988, Michaely and
Shaw examined the returns of 778 regular operating companies which typically attract
both types of investors–informed and uninformed and 39 master limited partnerships
(MLPs), which only attract uninformed investors. In support of Rock’s theory, the
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outcomes for operating companies showed that underpricing averaged 8.5% and was
statistically significant, the IPOs of MLPs displayed marginal overpricing that was not
statistically significant.
As a result of this adverse selection process and the higher probability of
investing in overpriced shares, uninformed investors will on average lose money in the
IPO market and will need underpricing to induce these investors back to the market (Wu,
2014), while underpricing compensates the informed investors for the costs of becoming
informed (Bacon & Arkorful, 2015; Miloud, 2014; Wu, 2014). Similarly, Jiang et al.
(2015) found that oversubscription by informed (institutional investors) and uninformed
investors (retail investors) to be one of the determinants of underpricing in the Indian
IPOs. However, Bhattacharya and Chakrabarti (2014) found when they investigated 70
Indian IPOs issued from May 2010 to November 2011 that the degree of IPO
underpricing is negatively related to adverse selection risk in the IPO market, and
information made available as a result of underpricing can counter post IPO adverse
selection problems in the market. Institutional investors, defined by Katti and Phani
(2016) as the informed investors, constitute the larger segment of investors in the
Jamaican IPO market (JSE, 2018). Accordingly, the level of underpricing indicated by
this study may point to the extent and influence of the private versus the institutional
investors in this small developing economy.
Signaling theories. The signaling model, first enunciated by Leland and Pyle
(1977), found support from Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989), and Hidayat and
Kusumastuti (2014). According to Wu (2014) the signaling theory built on the
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assumption that information inequity exists between the investor and the issuer and Lee,
Jin, and Li (2015) opined that IPOs are among the few corporate events that provide the
firm with a distinct information advantage relative to investors and the firm may choose
to capitalize on that advantage. This asymmetric information affords internal stakeholders
of the IPO firm exclusive access to information about the prospects of the firm and
therefore can apply extensive control over the internal decision-making process (Hull,
Kwak, & Walker, 2014). The more informed IPO issuers are aware of the information
gap that the average investor faces and understand that this information gap limits the
investor’s ability to assess the firm value and IPO quality (Wu, 2014). Wu also indicated
that investors therefore, cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality firms
because of the limited or no access to private insider information.
As a result of this information deficiency, the financial markets and the investors
will value all IPOs at an average price and force out of the market any IPO priced above
this average price (Hidayat & Kusumastuti, 2014). Accordingly, issuers disclose their
otherwise private information by sending overt signals to the investors to address
information asymmetry, allay risk concerns, spur demand, generate interest in, and
differentiate their IPO from the other IPOs in that market (Miloud, 2014). The issuing
firm, therefore, increases the disclosure of verifiable quantitative information via the
financial statements and prospectus to reduce uncertainty (Miloud, 2014; Thompson,
2016). Miloud (2014) also pointed out that soft qualitative information, though more
difficult to verify externally and can be more easily manipulated, may also be available,
while Loughran and McDonald (2014) suggested regulations such as the plain English
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rule, which US regulators require, should help to provide investors with information
devoid of legal terminologies and complex information.
Like Miloud (2014), Widarjo, Rahmawati, Bandi, and Widagdo, (2017)
concluded that intellectual capital disclosure had a significant negative effect on
underpricing. Intellectual capital disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and
hence provide potential investors with a basis to assess the quality, value, and future of a
prospective IPO firm (Widarjo et al., 2017). Barth, Landsman, and Taylor (2017)
explored the effect of the reduced disclosure provisions under the US-based Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) on information uncertainty in IPO firms. Using a
sample of 376 firms, 158 emerging growth companies which benefit under the JOBS Act
and 218 non-emerging growth firms, found that reduction in mandatory disclose
regarding some aspects of the business resulted in higher IPO underpricing (Barth et al.,
2017). SMEs that trade on the JSE junior market must comply with more lenient
disclosure rules, similar to what the US-based JOBS Act seeks to achieve, and therefore
the findings from this study may be able to shed some light on the level of underpricing
experienced by IPO firms operating under these conditions in the Jamaican IPO market.
According to Hidayat and Kusumastuti (2014), the high-quality firm can signal to
the market its firm's condition, and the market will react to these positive signals along
with other announcements available at the time of the IPO. Hidayat and Kusumastuti
argued further that it is important that these signals are costly and difficult to be
replicated by low-quality firms. Even though Leland and Pyle (1977) initiated the first
discourse on signaling and identified IPO share retention ratio as the primary signal,
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subsequent studies isolated or suggested other signals including IPO underpricing (Allen
& Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989), corporate governance (Hidayat & Kusumastuti, 2014),
dividends payments (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Chen, Chou, & Lee, 2014), and research
and development (R&D) projects (Hull et al., 2016). In this study, the discussion includes
two of these signals, underpricing in the segment below and IPO share retention ratio
included earlier in the discussion of the independent variables.
IPO underpricing as a signal. Using a similar underlying argument as Leland and
Pyle (1977), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) explored underpricing as a signal of IPO
quality. The underpricing signal will attract investors to the market because of investors’
belief that only strong, high-quality companies can absorb the costs associated with
underpricing (Miloud, 2014; Welch, 1989). Despite the importance of the signaling
model as the economic rationale for explaining IPO underpricing, the empirical evidence
provides mixed results (Michaely & Shaw, 1994).
Michaely and Shaw (1994) tested three of the proposals put forward by Allen and
Faulhaber’s (1989) model and found no support for any. Contrary to the model, Michaely
and Shaw found that firms that pay dividends or experience higher earnings during IPO’s
first two years of trading show significantly lower underpricing. Based on the result of
their study, Michaely and Shaw concluded that underpricing did not appear to signal
high-quality firms because greater underpricing relates to lower subsequent earnings, not
higher as predicted by Allen and Faulhaber. Additionally, firms that underprice less paid
higher dividends not lower as predicted and market reactions to dividend announcements
did not depend on the initial underpricing of the firm’s IPO (Michaely & Shaw, 1994).
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Francis, Hasan, Lothian, and Sun (2010) studied 413 foreign IPOs issued in the
U.S. market from 1985 to 2000 but domiciled in either financially integrated or
segmented markets. Francis et al. found evidence that signaling helps to determine
underpricing especially for firms domiciled in countries with segmented markets because
these firms tend to face relatively high information asymmetry, and difficulty accessing
external capital markets. Francis et al. concluded that in line with the premise of the
signaling theory, some firms may sacrifice IPO proceeds by accepting underpricing in the
current period because of the signal of a more favorable price for seasoned offerings.
Small developing countries with small dependent economies tend to have segmented
financial markets, as defined by Francis et al. (2010). Accordingly, the findings from this
study which investigated underpricing as an outcome (in other words, the desired and
undesired outcomes for the investor and the issuer respectively) may point to the extent to
which the underpricing holds as a market signal in this small economy.
Certification theories. The theorists who purport or support the certification
argument, Logue (1973), Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter and
Manaster (1990), and Michaely and Shaw (1994) followed a premise similar to that
outlined in the signaling theories. Information asymmetry exists between investors and
issuers and that both the investors and the issuers are aware of this information gap
(Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Booth & Smith, 1986). The investors understand that insiders are
in a position to selectively present information that can support the overpricing of the
issue (Katti & Phani, 2016). Accordingly, Katti and Phani (2016) suggested that potential
investors require third parties to act as observable indications of the quality the issue, to

68
validate the information released by the issuer regarding the value of the IPO, and to
address the inherent issuer bias.
Certification indicates the achievement of a minimum level of quality and can
reduce asymmetric information (Van Der Schaar, & Zhang, 2015). The third parties
required by investors to act as certifiers of IPO issues included prestigious underwriters,
usually investment bankers who primarily provide underwriting services to IPO issuers
(Booth & Smith, 1986; Bangsund, 2014). Reputable auditors also act as certifiers and
according to Chipeta and Jardine (2014), auditors may improve IPO performance.
Chipeta and Jardine found that South African firms that use the dominant international
auditors tend to have improved performance as measured by post-market adjusted
returns. The final group of certifiers is venture capitalists and according to Heo, Sohn,
and Ji (2014) this group tends to invest in firms especially SMEs based on the strength of
IPOs. Venture capitalists have a tendency to retain equity positions after an IPO (Cao,
Tang, & Yuan, 2013; Miloud, 2016; Tanda & Anderloni, 2014), bring much to the
investment including time commitment, managerial services, monitoring, and networking
skills through access to key industry stakeholders (Bhagat, 2014), and can use the IPO as
a vehicle to exit the investment (Guo, Jiang, & Mai, 2015).
According to Handa and Singh (2014), the reputation of these third parties
provides the investors with insights about the quality and risk level of the firm. Reputable
certifiers also bring legitimacy and credibility to the issue and issuers at the time of IPO,
thus strengthening market valuations and performance (Handa & Singh, 2014). In
addition to these external third-party certifiers, Bansal and Khanna (2013) added
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regulators, stating that the mandatory grading of IPOs, as is the case in India, also acts as
a source of credible certification.
Bansal and Khanna (2013) investigated 168 IPOs issued in India and found that
the mandatory grading of IPOs impacted the level of underpricing in the market.
Specifically, Bansal and Khanna found evidence to show that underpricing was lower
under the post-grading regime and also lower for high-grade IPOs. Similar findings also
surfaced when Sharma (2014) investigated a sample of 131 graded IPOs in the overall
data set of 355 IPOs and found evidence to show that there was a negative relationship
between grading and IPO underpricing with the non-graded stock showing almost three
times more underpricing and the graded IPOs.
Banerjee and Rangamani (2014) did not find any evidence to support the claim
that graded IPOs had a positive impact on underpricing. Similarly, when Jacob and
Agarwalla (2015) applied cross-sectional regression to a sample of 182 graded IPOs
issued from 2005 to 2011, Jacob and Agarwalla found no significant impact on
underpricing. However, the results of the investigation indicated that the grading of the
IPOs impacted the demand by institutional investors but not retail investors (Jacob &
Agarwalla, 2015). In this study I have confined the discussion of the certification models
solely to the role and impact of the underwriter.
Logue (1973), who was among the first to suggest that underwriters played a
certification role in the IPO process, used a sample of 250 IPOs issued between 1965 and
1969 to model IPO market performance as the dependent variable against ten
independent variables including underwriter prestige Logue (1973) found that IPOs
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underwritten by non-prestigious underwriters outperformed the market when compared to
those supported by prestigious underwriters, implying that there was a greater level of
underpricing with the former than the latter. Booth and Smith’s (1986) model also
investigated the relationship between IPO performance and the underwriter reputation
and found evidence to support the prediction that there is a positive relationship between
underpricing and the potential reduction in information asymmetry. Booth and Smith
argued that good companies will try to reduce information asymmetry by recruiting the
services of brand name underwriters to provide credibility to the issue. Investors use the
underwriter’s reputation to assess IPO quality because underwriters invest much in
building their reputation and credibility and will not endanger this reputation by
associating with risky IPOs (Booth & Smith, 1986).
Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) certification model incorporated Rock’s (1986)
premise that asymmetric information exists between the informed and uninformed
investors. However, unlike Rock (1986) who argued that underpricing is an incentive to
lure the uninformed investors back to the IPO market, Beatty and Ritter suggested that
the market value of the IPO is more important to the investor, and therefore predicted a
positive relationship between underpricing and uncertainty (risk) associated with the IPO
market value. Beatty and Ritter assumed that the issuer is aware of the fundamentals of
the company and introduced the underwriter as part of the oversight mechanism. Beatty
and Ritter conducted their research over two distinct periods and determining that of the
49 underwriters examined in the first period, 25 underwriters priced in alignment with the
risk of the IPO issues, while the other 24 mispriced. In the subsequent period, the 25
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underwriters who applied efficient pricing experienced a 50% less erosion of their market
share relative to the underwriters who mispriced issues (Beatty & Ritter, 1986),
suggesting that the market value of the IPO is important to the investor who will stay
with the underwriter who prices the IPO close to its market value.
Subsequent studies including that of Carter and Manaster (1990) explored the
assertion of their predecessors that less underpricing occurs when information asymmetry
declines. In their model, underwriters were the conduits through which information
asymmetry declined because reputable underwriters will only represent high-quality IPOs
(Carter & Manaster, 1990). The outcome of their research in which they found a
statistically significant negative relationship between underpricing and underwriter
reputation supported the premise that less underpricing occurs when information
asymmetry declines. The findings from Michaely and Shaw’s (1994) study of a larger
sample of 947 companies that issued IPOs from 1984 to 1988 confirmed these results.
As implied by Ritter (2003b) in his work on European and American IPO
markets, even with consistent research findings across theoretical and empirical studies,
generally accepted answers to questions relating to market phenomenon such as IPO
underpricing raised in literature may not suffice beyond the current period. Ritter
indicated that new questions will continue to surface because no steady state exists for the
financial markets nor the IPO ecosystem. This study may, therefore, add to the literature
by providing some answers but also raising some questions about businesses in small
economies seeking to understand the relationship between IPO underpricing, IPO share
retention ratio, and the reputation of the IPO underwriter. Accordingly, this study may
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contribute to improved business operations by helping potential IPO firms to more
effectively manage the IPO process, improve the interaction with the IPO underwriter,
attract potential investors, and maximize IPO porceeds.
Transition
Extensive documentation exists in the literature about the interplay of IPO share
retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter, and IPO underpricing. However,
while the evidence suggests that the theoretical basis has a sound foundation, the
empirical evidence is mixed and lacks consesnsus. The complexity, convergence, and
contradiction surrounding the topic of IPO underpricing may explain the continued
interest from business practitioners, the academic community, and market players across
countries, as well as the need for additional research.
The premise that IPO underpricing is unavoidable in an environment of
information asymmetry (Jiang et al., 2015), supports the use of the EMH, itself
underpinned by asymmetric information, to frame this study. This literature review
highlighted the existing research on IPO underpricing and what researchers had to say
about its relationship with IPO share retention ratio, and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter within the context of asymmetric information. Additionally, most of the
documented work included research on IPO underpricing mainly in developed, emerging
and large developing economies with limited research on small developing countries.
Katti and Phani (2016) noted that the extent of information asymmetry as reported in the
literature differs in developing and emerging economies relative to developed countries
suggesting the need for additional research to help the business community in smaller
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dependent economies understand and optimize the IPO process. This study may
contribute to this area.
Section 2 includes information on the process and methodology adopted for this
quantitative correlational study. Specifically, this section contains a discussion on my
role as the researcher, the process of data collection and data analysis, hypotheses
formulation and testing, research method and design, as well as issues relating to ethics,
reliability, and validity. In section 3, I presented the results of the data analysis prefaced
by the evaluation of assumptions required to apply parametric tests and multiple
regressions. Section 3 also includes application for professional practice, implications for
social change, recommendations for action and further study, reflections, and
conclusions.
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Section 2: The Project
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter,
and IPO underpricing. The independent variables are IPO share retention ratio, measured
by the percentage of IPO shares retained, and IPO underwriter reputation operationalized
as underwriter’s rank based on market share of IPOs supported in the market. The
dependent variable is IPO underpricing as indicated by the first-day market return on the
IPO stock price. The population included IPO firms trading on the JSE.
The results of this study may contribute to the business community by providing
information to company executives seeking financing via IPO on how best to optimize
the IPO process to ensure successful IPOs. The research outcomes may also generate
better investment decisions by forcing increased information disclosure from issuers to
investors. This study may contribute to social change by helping company executives and
policymakers in small developing economies to understand how successful IPOs can
increase employment, and thereby reduce income inequality and improve socioeconomic
indicators across households and communities that they serve.
Role of the Researcher
In line with Garg (2016), the role of the researcher in this quantitative
correlational study involved collecting, organizing, standardizing, analyzing, and
interpreting the data. The researcher is also accountable for the research design and
execution, setting the context of the research, defining the search terms, hypotheses, and
analytical parameters, determining the appropriate population and sample, as well as the
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tools to analyze the data (Moon, 2015; Warwick-Booth, 2014). As implied in the report
of Köhler, Landis, and Cortina (2017), the role of the researcher includes identifying an
appropriate research question supported by the relevant literature, selecting a research
design aligned to the research question, ensuring suitable sample and research context,
high measurement standard and quality as well as effective reporting of design and
procedures.
In conducting research, it is essential for the researcher to observe and maintain
ethical standards and concerns at each stage of the research process and account for
ethical considerations (Greenwood, 2016; Ngulube, 2015). The expectation is that
researchers must act responsibly and in an ethical manner particularly when conducting
research involving humans and animals (Holbrook, Dally, Avery, Lovat, & Fairbairn,
(2017). Therefore, the researcher should think and act ethically, and the ethics review
process is a conduit to support the development of such skills (Hott, Limberg, Ohrt, &
Schmit, 2015; Tatebe, 2015). As part of this process, the Belmont Report (1979) provides
compliance guidelines for researchers who include human subjects as part of their
research. This study did not include any human participants, only data from secondary
sources. Therefore, the guidelines from the Belmont Report do not apply.
One of the principal roles of the researcher is to avoid or mitigate bias by
adopting the appropriate steps (Garg, 2016). There are three possible sources from which
bias could have entered in the management and analysis of the data in this study. First, I
was recently employed to a commercial bank whicis part of a financial group of
companies that includes an investment bank. This investment bank supports IPOs issued
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by the companies in the sample. Second, because of the size and reach of this financial
group, some of the sample companies may also conduct business with the organization.
Third, at the personal level, my investment portfolio includes stocks managed by an
investment bank that supports firms in the sample. However, the use of the historical and
quantitative data in research improves the objectivity (Park & Park, 2016), and applying
secondary data for this study protected the data, analyses, and outcomes from the
influence of such relationships. However, I am fully aware that these relationships exist
and could have, over time, influence personal beliefs and perceptions about the
companies in this sample and their operations.
Participants
Previous researchers on IPOs and IPO underpricing, such as Miloud (2014) and
Ritter (2015), used secondary data in their research. In line with this precedence, I used
secondary publicly available data and did not include human participants in this study.
The use of secondary data diminishes the need to adhere the guidelines relating to
respect, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice enunciated by Bhaskar and
Manjuladevi (2016), and the compliance directives detailed in the Belmont Report
(1979).
The secondary data for this study came from the JSE, which houses annual reports
and prospectuses for all companies that issued IPOs and those traded on both JSE’s main
and junior markets. In addition to its main market the JSE also has a junior market
designed to encourage and promote investment in Jamaica’s entrepreneurship and
economic development by listing small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) with
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capital base ranging from $50 to $500 million Jamaican dollars and an IPO offer of at
least $50 million (JSE, 2009). Pandes and Robinson’s (2014) position that the
development of a junior market is essential to the economic health of a country seems to
support the establishment of the JSE junior market. This could possibly explained why
Pandes and Robinson lamented that the decline in the number of IPO issues in the US
market especially for smaller companies impacted the ability of smaller companies to
raise capital, and in the process tempered the growth of smaller companies and eliminate
millions of jobs. The average number of IPOs per year declined by 68.06%, from 310 to
99 for the period 2001 to 2012 relative to the period 1980 to 2000, and the decline was
worse for small companies (Gao, Ritter, & Zhu, 2013). The decline for IPOs issued by
small companies averaged 83.03% with mean volume dwindling from 165 IPOs per year
during 1980-2000 to 28 per year during 2001-2012 (Ritter, 2014).
The JSE allowed access to the secondary data used in this study via electronic and
paper-based databases on its website and in its offices located in Kingston, Jamaica
respectively. This data are accessible to the public, and therefore did not require
permission to access. The final sample included all the IPOs issued in the defined
research period after screening to remove preference shares and U.S. dollar-denominated
issues. The time-saving justification put forward by Fanning (2014) and the
straightforward and inexpensive access rationale from Bhaskar and Manjuladevi (2016)
for using secondary data helped to substantiate the use of this type of data in this study.
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Research Method and Design
The methodology is a fundamental component of the research process which
reflects researchers’ common views, philosophies, norms, and principles and provides a
framework through which to address the research questions (Garg, 2016; Murshed &
Zhang, 2016). Ngulube (2015) indicated that the purpose of the research defined by the
research question(s), determines the appropriate research methodology. Further,
understanding the methodology is key to obtaining reliable outcomes (Garg, 2016).
Research Method
Researchers can choose one of three methods for their research: quantitative,
qualitative, or mixed methods (Raich, Müller, & Abfalter, 2014). Each of these methods
differs in the type of data and process involved and has limitations (Delost & Nadder,
2014; Turner, Cardinal, & Burton, 2015). The comparison of the quantitative and
qualitative research methods typically suggest that the quantitative method offers hard,
factual data, while the qualitative method presents softer and deeper insights (Barnham,
2015). Given the purpose, primary research question and related hypotheses for this
study, the quantitative method was appropriate.
According to Delost and Nadder (2014), qualitative research methods work best
for research topics with limited understanding and very little documented work. Murshed
and Zhang (2016) supported this position and added that it illuminates relative unknown
phenomenon through active entanglement with human subjects and in-depth chronicling
about their unique settings and perspectives. Ngulube (2015) added that the qualitative
research method is inductive and exploratory. This method provides the researcher with
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insights from the research participants’ perspectives of the human experience, points of
view, and motivations associated with a social problem, allowing the researcher an
opportunity to decipher or demystify previously unexplained issues (Bernard, 2013;
Delost & Nadder, 2014). Qualitative research methods also provide the researcher with a
mechanism to develop new theories or validate existing ones using a conceptual
framework (Delost & Nadder, 2014; Pinder, Prime, & Wilson, 2014). The objective of
this study was not to understand IPO stakeholders' perspective on whether a relationship
exists between IPO underpricing, share retention, and underwriter reputation. Therefore
the qualitative research method was not aligned to the objectives of this study.
In some instances, neither the quantitative nor qualitative method is appropriate to
fully address the research question and as such researchers employ the mixed method
approach (Delost & Nadder, 2014). Turner et al. (2015) believed that the mixed methods
approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies, can mitigate the
limitations inherent in each of the individual method. The mixed method is a multi
paradigm approach using the predictive and the exploratory strengths of the quantitative
and qualitative research methods respectively to produces a model that addresses a wider
range of research questions and in increased detail (Ngulube, 2015). The mixed method
allows the researcher to strengthen the quantitative findings or obtain an expanded insight
into the research statistics by incorporating the qualitative perspective which focuses on a
social issue or personal experience (Van Griensven et al., 2014; Venkatesh, Brown, &
Sullivan, 2016).
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Venkatesh et al. (2016) opined that the time and effort required to collect,
analyze, and validate both quantitative and qualitative data are significantly greater than
that of a single method. Complexities associated with the examination of some topics
may require a more comprehensive understanding, and therefore require the strengths of
quantitative and qualitative methods in a mixed methods study (Van Griensven et al.,
2014). For example, Bassous (2015) used quantitative research to assess the extrinsic
impact of independent variables and the qualitative research to examine the patterns of
behavior. This condition did not exist for this study, and the time and implied cost
impediments that Venkatesh et al. (2016) associated with this approach reinforce the
decision not to adopt the mixed method for this study.
According to Murshed and Zhang (2016), the objective of the quantitative
methodology is to seek clarifications and stress independence, generalizability and
consistency and rigor. The quantitative approach is numerically oriented, involves welldefined numerical measurements of theories and models and typically uses a statistical
framework to assess the strength and significance of prescribed hypotheses (Murshed &
Zhang, 2016). The quantitative method, through the use of experimental or non
experimental procedures, involves the collection, and analysis of quantifiable statistical
data summarized in numerical indices (Delost & Nadder, 2014). Accordingly, Ngulube
(2015) concluded that the quantitative method is theory led, tends to be confirmatory, and
can support the testing and enhancing of existing theories from a deductive perspective.
In line with precedence set by previous researchers on this topic and as recommended by
Roos, Thakar, Sultan, Leeuw, and Paulus (2014), I adopted a quantitative research
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method to examine the relationship between IPO underpricing, share retention and
underwriter reputation.
Research Design
The appropriate research design is essential to ensure the best and most reliable
outcomes and the research design provides indications about key attributes of the
research which may differ depending on whether the overall method is qualitative,
quantitative or mixed methods (Alavi, 2016; Garg, 2016). Quantitative research designs
contemplated for this study included experiment, case study and cross-sectional and
longitudinal surveys. However, I did not use any of these designs because the primary
research question in this study did not align with the purpose, research procedure, and the
data specifications associated with these research designs.
The first quantitative design considered was the experimental research design
According to Delost and Nadder (2014), the experimental research design exists in three
forms. In the pre-experimental form, the intervention applies to an additional subject
group but does not involve a control group (Delost & Nadder, 2014). The quasiexperimental design also does not use randomization or control groups but involves
manipulation of the independent variable with the cause-and-effect option. The third type
is the true experiment which applies experiment or statistical control methods to effect
full control of the variables (Delost & Nadder, 2014). The true experiment approach is
the most effective design for hypothesis testing because of the opportunity for the
researcher to establish causality (Delost & Nadder, 2014). In the experiment approach,
there is an equivalent control group that replicates the features of the treatment group
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with the only exception being the introduction of the treatment (Crane et al., 2017).
Independent of the forms, the procedure of determining an outcome by using a control
variable or subjecting participants to specific conditions or a controlled environment
(D'Onofrio et al., 2013), made this approach inappropriate for this study.
The second research design contemplated for this study was the case study. Case
studies provide the description of a phenomenon, the testing, or generating of a theory
and can help to bridge the gap between inductive and deductive research (Ngulube,
2015). In case studies, the researcher’s objective is to understand the uniqueness of
individual cases (Park & Park, 2016). Additionally, the sample size can be very small; in
extreme cases, one particular entity is worth investigating (Park, & Park, 2016). These
situations do not exist in this study; rather the objective was to investigate whether a
relationship exists between predetermined dependent and independent variables using
secondary data. Further, the purpose of this study was not to understand the uniqueness of
any single IPO company, hence the qualitative case study was not the best fit for this
research.
Survey design, categorized, as part of the non experimental group of quantitative
research designs, was the third option considered for this study (see Garg, 2016). In the
case of cross-sectional survey design, the data are static covering the research variables at
a single point in time (Watson, 2015), and is not considered ideal to investigate dynamic
management theories (Stritch, 2017). For longitudinal studies, the research includes the
examination of a data set of the same variable(s) to obtain information on how they
change over time (Stritch, 2017; Watson, 2015). In this study, the sample size spanned
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the period January 1986 to July 2018, and various companies issued IPOs during this
period. The purpose of this study did not require the tracking of the IPO of any single
company over time, and the sample mix included entities with diverse company
fundamentals (size, ownership, industry, etc.). For these reasons, neither the crosssectional nor the longitudinal approach was not adopted for this study.
When the objective of the study was to determine and explore the relationship that
exists (or not) between two or more quantifiable variables, as was the case for this study,
then the correlational research design is the most appropriate methodology (see Curtis et
al., 2016). As demonstrated by Alsulaiman, Forbes, Dean, and Cohen (2015), Bassous
(2015) and Pinder et al. (2014) correlational studies help the researcher to explore the
presence and extent of relationships among variables or conduct an exogenous
assessment of the impact of independent variables on dependent variables. The
expectation is that the variables move simultaneously whether in the same or opposite
direction (Delost & Nadder, 2014). The research may improve the effectiveness of a
correlational study by introducing statistical control variables to better estimate the
relationships among predictor and response variables (Becker et al., 2016). However
control variables were not a part of the statistical analysis plan for this study.
The correlational research design was appropriate for this study for the following
reasons. First, correlational studies apply when the objective of the researcher is to
determine if a relationship exists among variables as well as to ascertain the prevalence of
such relationships (Curtis et al., 2016). The objective of this study was to determine the
relationship between IPO underpricing and share retention and underwriter reputation.
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Second, the use of this tool dates back to the origin of the Pearson’s correlation technique
in the late 19th century and the flexibility of this design to indicate directional
relationships legitimize the arguments that correlational research design is a reasonable
tool of measurement (Wiedermann & Hagmann, 2016). Third, the common use of the
correlational research design in the literature as an analytical tool indicates that the
correlational design is the preferred option for researchers examining topics similar to
that of this study (Curtis et al., 2016). As demonstrated by Park and Park (2016), review
of previous research on a topic can help to influence the approach adopted for a research
project and this example helps to support the decision to use the correlational design in
this study. Finally, when compared to the other quantitative research designs the
correlational approach best aligns to the purpose and research questions of this study.
Population and Sampling
The preference for researchers such as Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2015), Deb
(2014), and Wu and Wan (2014) who studied IPOs and IPO performance, was to use
secondary historical data. Secondary data represent information previously documented
and exposed to some rigor of the statistical process (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016). In
this study, I used secondary data to assess whether a relationship existed between initial
first-day returns (IPO underpricing) and IPO share retention ratio and reputation of the
IPO underwriter for companies that issued IPOs in Jamaica and who remain trading on
the JSE. Similar to previous researchers who examined this topic, I restricted the data
points to a specific period (see Miloud, 2014; Ritter, 2015).
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While instances exist where previous researchers studied multiple markets
(Boulton et al., 2017; Chen et al. (2017); Kesten & Mungan, 2015), the precedence is for
researchers to focus on a single market. For example, Indriani and Marlia (2015) in the
Indonesian market, or a specific industry as demonstrated by Kesten and Mungan (2015)
who studied the life science industry and Morriconea, Munari, Orianic, and de
Rassenfosse, (2017) the U.S. semiconductor industry. This study replicated some of the
practices adopted by Ritter (2015) who examined the relationship between variables by
applying the correlational research design to historical data. Despite studying similar
topics, the population or sample used by previous researchers varied across studies
because the purpose and demographics of study determine sample size (Donaldson,
2015).
The population of IPOs issued in Jamaica spans a period dating back to the start
of the JSE in 1969. Typically companies that trade on all stock exchanges would have
gone through the IPO process at some time, and this outcome is also true for Jamaican
companies trading on the JSE. However, to ensure that the sample size for this study
adequately captures the most recent IPOs, I extended the sample date from January 1986
to July 2018. Additionally, the companies issuing the IPOs must engage the services of
an underwriting firm to support IPO either as lead underwriter or broker, and internal
stakeholders must retain a portion of the shares instead of offering 100% for sale.
These prerequisites remain consistent with the precedence set by Kumar (2017) to
ensure that each firm in the population has all the available data points for both the
independent and the dependent variables. The approach used by previous researchers who
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studied IPOs and IPO underpricing was to define a study period and use all the IPOs
issued during that period as the sample (Cao et al., 2013; Donaldson, 2015; Jeribi et al.,
2014; Ritter, 2015). The definition of the population for this study, both in terms of
period range and size, aligns to this precedence and supports its appropriateness for this
study.
Similar to the approach taken by Donaldson (2015), this study used a nonprobabilistic purposive sampling technique to determine the sample. As implied by Garg
(2016), this technique has an important disadvantage because each population participant
does not have an equal and non-zero opportunity of being selected; therefore, the sample
may not be representative of the population (Delost & Nadder, 2014). Despite this
weakness, the non-probabilistic purposive sampling approach allows the researcher to use
a defined criterion aligned to the research question to create a manageable cost efficient
sample that typifies a representative group (Barratt, Ferris, & Lenton, 2014; Delost &
Nadder, 2014). In the process, the researcher may reject data points outside the scope of
this defined criterion or selected subject profile (Barratt et al., 2014). This approach
worked for this study because the researcher was able to define criteria for sample
boundaries. For example, this study sample included only IPOs listed during the stated
period with a first day closing price that is greater than the IPO offer price. Not all firms
that issued IPOs during this period qualified, hence the non-probabilistic purposive
sampling approach was optimal for this study.
The simple random sampling approach in which each firm would have an equal
and independent chance of being selected has attractive advantages relating to ease of
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sampling and generalizability to the population (Delost & Nadder, 2014). This sampling
technique allows the researcher to draw conclusions regarding the general population
from the research outcomes (Delost & Nadder, 2014). Additionally, the selected sampling
technique must align with the research question(s) (Delost & Nadder, 2014). Using a
simple random sampling in this study would violate both the requirement for alignment
to the purpose of this study, as well as the need for each firm to have an equal chance of
being selected. For example, I eliminated sample firms that issued U. S. dollardenominated IPOs; therefore, the simple random sampling technique was not the best fit
for this study.
The size of the sample is an important consideration for researchers (Delost &
Nadder, 2014). Samples should be sufficiently large to be representative of the population
(Garg, 2016) and to permit a rigorous testing and subgroup analyses (Delost & Nadder,
2014). However, selecting too large a sample amplifies the risk of increased noise
associated with the heterogeneous population (Garg, 2016). In contrast, small samples,
though they may be appropriate for homogenous populations (Delost & Nadder, 2014),
may not adequately address the research question (Garg, 2016).
In this study, the goal was to define the sample as the universe of IPOs issued
from January 1986 to July 2018 and to follow the precedence established by other
researchers such as Zeligman, Varney, Grad, and Huffstead (2018) by using the G*Power
software to estimate the sample size for this study. The sample size was 52 which is
within the range of 43 and 68 estimated by the G*Power software version 3.1.9.2, at the
95% confidence level (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009). This sample size
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represents the post-screening position after omitting preference shares and U. S. dollardenominated issues. All the data points in this final sample spanned the same period and
the sample includes for each IPO firm, the first-day initial return, the percentage of shares
retained (i.e., shares not offered for sale), and the underwriter reputation as reflected by
the market share of IPOs supported.
Ethical Research
According to Ngulube (2015), researchers must observe and maintain ethical
standards and concerns at each stage of the research process, and an important part of this
practice is the need to obtain participants’ informed consent. Bhaskar and Manjuladevi
(2016) believed that the researcher of studies involving human participants must obtain
informed written consent from participants about their unintimidated willingness to
participate in the research. The researchers must safeguard information relating to these
participants from unauthorized access and disclose only under special and prescribed
conditions (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016). Doctoral studies under the supervision of
Walden University must withstand the scrutiny of the institutional review board (IRB)
that ensures that studies (both in terms of process and outcomes) conform to professional
standards, the university mandates, and all appropriate laws.
In line with previous research (Alcaniz et al., 2015; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013;
Deb, 2014; Hidayat & Kusumastuti, 2014; Ritter, 2015), this study used secondary data
to investigate the relationship, if any between IPO underpricing, share retention ratio, and
underwriter reputation. The publicly available data used in this study did not include any
human participants. Accordingly, the informed consent protocol, the related
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confidentiality agreements, and consent forms referenced by Bhaskar and Manjuladevi
(2016) did not apply to this study. However, I retained the data for the customary five
years , allowing access to myself and authorized Walden personnel only and scrubbing to
remove all identifiable information relating to specific companies.
Instrumentation
Hagan (2014) suggested that researchers can find valid and reliable research
instruments by scrutinizing previous works in their area of focus. Many of the studies on
IPOs, IPO underpricing, and related areas such as Abu Bakar and Uzaki (2013), Bédard,
et al. (2016), Donaldson (2015), and Jeribi et al. (2014), used secondary data and as such,
in this study I applied secondary data archived from publicly accessible sources.
According to Bhaskar and Manjuladevi (2016), secondary data represent information
compiled by someone other than the current user and exposed to aspects of the statistical
process. The use of secondary data saves time, is easy, and inexpensive to execute
(Fanning, 2014; Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016) and may also help to mitigate concerns
relating to instrument reliability and validity.
Despite not using the typical research instruments, the secondary data measured
the dependent and predictor variables for this study which are IPO underpricing, IPO
share retention, and underwriter reputation. IPO underpricing measures the return on the
first day of trading of IPO stock, the IPO share retention ratio compares the amount of
share retained by the firm’s internal stakeholders relative the total number of shares
outstanding, and the underwriter reputation represents the market share of the value or
number of IPOs supported. The secondary data that measured these variables came from
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the JSE. Companies listed on the JSE must adhere to information disclosure and
governance standards approved by the JSE, thus improving the reliability of their
published information (JSE, 2009). Additionally, the JSE collaborates with and provides
information to entities at both the local and global levels and is an affiliate of the World
Federation of Exchanges (WFE). Accordingly the JSE must adhere to international best
practices, professional and compliance standards relating to data collection, husbandry,
and governance (see JSE, 2018; WFE, 2018).
The secondary data from the JSE’s electronic and paper-based sources provided
information in the required format for the research variables in this study or the data
points necessary to calculate the required ratios for the variables. For example, for each
IPO company listed in the sample, the information from the JSE included the IPO offer
price, closing price on the first day of trading, number of shares offered to the public by
the firms, the total number of share outstanding, and the IPO underwriter or broker. The
JSE also provided, by way of the firms’ prospectuses, key demographic, economic, and
financial data on the sample IPO firms such as firm size and type, industry, and
profitability.
In line with the definition stated in the research work of Leong and Sundarasen
(2015), as well as Wong et al. (2014), the dependent variable for this study, that is, IPO
underpricing represents a ratio expressed in percentage form. Similarly, the measurement
scale for IPO share retention the first of two independent variables is in ratio format, as
wasthe case of the research conducted by He et al. (2015). As demonstrated in the work
of Indriani and Marlia (2015) in Indonesia and that of Wu and Wan (2014) in China,
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underwriter reputation, the second independent variable in this study reflected a
dichotomous variable. I collected the secondary data for this study directly from the
JSE’s electronic and paper-based files. Therefore, except for organizing the data using an
Excel spreadsheet, no additional calculations or coding of the data collected was
necessary. Appendix C includes a sample of the raw data.
Data Collection Technique
The data collection technique is an important consideration for any research
because of the ability to become an avenue through which bias and error enter the
research (Garg, 2016). Before communicating the research findings, it is important to
espouse information related to procedural reliability and data collection methods and
procedures (Hott et al., 2015). Using secondary data from existing (electronic and nonelectronic) sources is inexpensive and unobtrusive relative to primary sources (Bhaskar &
Manjuladevi, 2016). According to Ellram and Tate (2016), secondary data refer to the
quantitative or qualitative data not collected by the researcher and usually for a purpose
other than the one intended by the researcher. Similar to the precedence set by Abu Bakar
and Uzaki (2013), Bédard et al. (2016), Donaldson (2015), and Jeribi et al. (2014), I used
secondary data in this study. The primary source for the data was the JSE’s main and
junior markets.
Bhaskar and Manjuladevi (2016) indicated that one of the disadvantages of using
secondary data is the risk of omission that is, missing data points. To address this
challenge required the omission of the sample points for which the required information
was not available. Ellram and Tate (2016) indicated that the provision of precise
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guidelines for reporting data can help to prevent distortion in secondary data, resulting
from variations in accounting policies and internal company practices. Ellram and Tate
further cautioned that in using secondary data, the researcher must assess for data
reliability, that is, is the data consistently reported over time and data validity, that is, can
the secondary data address the research purpose and question.
The JSE provided strict directives regarding the content, quality, and frequency of
the reports submitted, as well as mandatory compliance rules regarding governance and
operational procedures to address the data reliability (JSE, 2018b). The credibility of the
operations of the JSE is evident in the increased use of the JSE data by global companies,
international agencies, and associations. For instance, the information on Jamaica’s
trading and market activities published by Bloomberg comes directly from the JSE (JSE,
2018b). Bloomberg also tracks the performance of the JSE and reported recently that for
the last five years, the JSE’s market rally was the largest globally (McDonald, 2018).
The database for the JSE, which is the primary source for this study’s data,
contains all the market and trading activities for the companies listed on the exchange.
For each firm, the JSE database houses information such as market capitalization, offer
price, offer volume, the percentage of total shares offered in the IPO, name of
underwriter/broker, closing price at the end of the first day of trading and other historical
prices, and trading volume (JSE, 1986- 1994; JSE, 2018a). The JSE also houses annual
reports and prospectuses for all companies that issued IPOs and listed companies on the
exchange.
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The sample data for this study included all IPOs issued from January 1986 to July
2018, except for adjustments. The data from the JSE were adequate to address the
purpose and research question for this study and as such resolved the data validity
question. I started the data collection process after receiving IRB approval (IRB approval
number: 06-01-18-0341619). For each company included in the sample, I collected
information on the offer price, offer volume, the percentage of total shares offered in the
IPO, name of the underwriter/broker, and closing price at the end of the first day of
trading. The market share of total IPOs (both volume and value) supported by each IPO
underwriter was the proxy for underwriter reputation, one of the predictive variables in
this study.
Watson (2015) suggested that an Excel spreadsheet is an option for data entry and
according to Peng (2015), consensus exists that Excel can be extremely helpful in its
application to financial analyses. Further, Makwana and Rathod (2014) recommended
that Microsoft Excel is an effective data husbandry, organization, and comparative tool.
Therefore, I used an excel spreadsheet to achieve similar objectives for this study.
Data Analysis
Data analysis is the process of estimation that investigates associations among
variables and generates a sample statistic that corresponds to the population’s parameter
(Watson, 2015; Zyphur & Pierides, 2017). The purpose of the data analytical framework
adopted for this study was to explore the relationship between share retention ratio (i.e.,
the percentage of shares retained by internal stakeholders in an IPO), the reputation of the
IPO underwriter (represented by market share of IPOs underwritten), and IPO
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underpricing (i.e., as measured by the stock percentage returns on the first day of
trading). The two independent variables occurred frequently in the existing body of
literature on IPO underpricing as predictor variables and Butler et al. (2014) concluded
that these two variables were among the 16 robust determinants of IPO underpricing
identified after testing a total of 48 variables. The following primary and support
questions encapsulated the purpose of this study, as well as contextualized the related
data analyses.
What is the relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of
the IPO underwriter, and IPO underpricing? The following secondary questions support
this primary research question.
RQ-1: What is the relationship, if any, between a firm’s IPO share retention ratio
and IPO underpricing?
RQ-2: What is the relationship, if any, between the reputation of the IPO
underwriter and IPO underpricing?
RQ-3: What is the impact of underwriter reputation on the relationship between a
firm’s IPO share retention ratio and IPO underwriting?
RQ-4: What is the relationship, if any, between firm’s IPO share retention ratio,
the reputation of the IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing?
From the perspective of the quantitative researcher, creating and designing
variables to measure theoretical concepts is an unavoidable aspect of hypothesis testing
(Morgan, 2015). Accordingly, the related null and alternative hypotheses that
operationalized these research questions are:
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H01: There is no statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between the reputation of the
IPO underwriter and IPO underpricing.
H03: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has no statistically significant impact
on the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
Ha3: The reputation of the IPO underwriter has statistically significant impact on
the relationship between IPO share retention ratio and IPO underpricing.
H04: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter do not jointly explain IPO underpricing.
Ha4: The firm’s IPO share retention ratio and the reputation of the IPO
underwriter jointly explain IPO underpricing.
Screening the data is an important prerequisite for the analysis phase of the
research, and many researchers in the IPO space use this procedure. For example, in the
research on Canadian IPOs issued from 1982 to 2002, Bédard et al. (2016) screened for
IPOs that did not develop any market; Donaldson (2015) screened out limited
partnerships, mutual funds, and American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in his study of
IPOs listed on NASDAQ and NYSE between 2007 and 2007, and Liu (2014) removed
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from the sample of IPOs issued between 1987 and 2007, companies that did not have at
least two years of data prior to the IPO. From the data set collected for this study, I
eliminated all IPOs for preference shares, U.S. dollar-denominated IPOs and firms for
which all the data points were not available.
As demonstrated by Kumar (2017), the data screening process exposed missing
and incorrect data. This approach also worked for this study. Where unavailable missing
or incorrect data existed, the examples of omission illustrated by Jeribi et al. (2014) and
Kumar (2017) applied. Watson (2015) opined on the importance of using the appropriate
statistical method to analyze quantitative data. From the basket of statistical methods
available for analyzing quantitative data and specifically IPO data and in line with the
precedence set by previous researchers such as Gonzalez (2014), I adopted, for this study
an analytical framework that includes the OLS multiple regression analysis including
descriptive statistics, and the Spearman ranked correlation matrix.
In deciding how to measure the association between the variables in this study, I
considered a number of options including systems of equations/econometrical models as
well as the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices. As demonstrated by Cao et al.
(2013) in their assessment of venture capital support for IPOs, econometric models apply
in situations that require a series of complex regression equations (linear or non-linear)
and span qualitative or quantitative data (Low & Meghir, 2017). Schaub, M. (2015)
applied a system of equations to estimate excess returns in their effort to determine the
short-term wealth effects accrued to American Depository Receipt (ADR) investors.
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These scenarios do not exist for this study, accordingly I did not consider econometric
modeling/system of equations appropriate for analyzing the data in this study.
I also considered the use of either the Pearson or Spearman correlation matrix to
as part of the analytical framework of this study. According to Alfons, Croux, and
Filzmoser, (2017) both these measures of correlation are standard tools used in statistical
practice to measure association among variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient is a
parametric test which requires the non-violation of the normality and linearity
assumptions and measures the strength of the relationship between two variables
(Donaldson, 2015).
Unlike Pearson’s correlation tool, the Spearman rank order correlation is a nonparametric test that can apply to skewed non-normal distributions and does not assume
any special conditions about data normality (Donaldson, 2015). Given that the sample for
this study violated the normality assumption, the Spearman ranked correlation matrix was
the better option. By deciding to adopt the Spearman ranked correlation, I incorporated
an approach similar to that of Donaldson (2015) who used the Spearman correlation
coefficient to assess the extent of the relationship among the research variables. With the
strength of not requiring the normality assumption (Bishara, & Hittner, 2014), the
Spearman correlation allows the researcher to examine the strength of the relationship
between independent and dependent variables, when paired individually (Zhang et al.,
2015). Accordingly, I used the Spearman correlation to evaluate the relationship between
IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter, and the first-day market
return on the IPO stock price (IPO underpricing).
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According to Zhang et al. (2015), multiple regression analysis is a popular go-to
analytical tool for prediction purposes and supports the determination of causality
between independent and dependent variables. The OLS regression is the primary
analytical tool for this study. The following assumptions must hold for the results of the
multiple regression analysis to be reliable: (a) normality (i.e., normal distribution of the
error terms), (b) linearity (i.e., a linear relationship exists between the explanatory and
explained variables), (c) multicollinearity (i.e., the independent variables are not highly
correlated), (d) homoscedasticity (evenly distributed variances of the error terms around
the independent variables), and (e) autocorrelation. (i.e., the error terms are independent
and uncorrelated for any two observations (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015).
Violation of these assumptions may require adjustments in the data or the
application of other types of analyses to improve the reliability and robustness of the
multiple regression outcomes (Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014; Willis & Hyde, 2014). Where
the assessment of the regression assumptions revealed violation of some assumptions, I
applied corrective measures in line with precedence set by researchers. For example, I
imitated the approach used by Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) and applied the
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error (HCSE) multiple regression instead of the
standard regression analysis because of theviolated the homoscedasticity assumption.
In its generic form, the multiple regression model, typically presented as an
algebraic expression is:
Y = α +β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + . . . + βixi + ei

99
where Y represents the dependent variable and the Xs the independent variables α is the
constant and the βs are coefficients of the independent variables, and the sample
generates both α and β (Zhang et al., 2015).
In line with the precedence set by Abu Bakar and Uzaki (2013) who investigated
420 IPOs listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange, the definition of IPO underpricing in
this study was
UPi =

CPi − OPi
OPi

where UPᵢ represented underpricing in firm i,
CPᵢ: closing price in firm i
OFᵢ: offering price in firm i
Similarly, in line with the generic multiple regression equation above and the format used
by Abu Bakar and Azaki, I defined the relationship between the independent variables in
this study, share retention, and underwriter reputation, and the dependent variable IPO
underpricing as
UPi = α + β1SRi + β2URi + ei
where UPᵢ represents IPO underpricing in firm i, (i.e., the first day return on the IPO
stock)
SRᵢ: Share retention ratio, that is, the percentage of shares retained by internal
stakeholders of IPO firm i
URᵢ: the reputation of the IPO underwriter for firm i (measured as the market share of
IPOs underwritten)
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The data analysis plan details the various statistical methods used in this study
(see Appendix A). In addition to the evalution of assumtions, the execution of this plan
also iincluded descriptive statistics. Using an approach consistent with that of Gao et al.
(2013), Long (2016), and Ritter (2015), I included descriptive statistics in the analytical
frame of this study. According to Delost and Nadder (2014), descriptive statistics allow
the researcher to scrutinize, categorize as appropriate, and document the key features of
the data such as variable similarities and differences. Ritter (2015) demonstrated this
approach by applying mainly descriptive statistics to a sample of 340 IPOs issued from
1980-2012 to investigate the impact of growth capital-backed IPOs. Based on the
precedence set by previous researchers, I used descriptive statistics in this study because,
as indicated by Long (2016), this strategy allowed for sample-to-population
generalizations.
Finally, coupled with the regression analysis, the analysis of variance analysis
(ANOVA), represented in algebraic form by the F-statistic value (Mishra, 2016) also
forms a part of the analytical framework. As demonstrated by Brycz, Dudycz, and
Kowalski (2017) and Vijay Kumar and Gupta (2014) who investigated IPOs in the Polish
and Indian markets respectively, ANOVA assesses the overall significance of the
regression analysis model and in the case of this study examined the joint impact of share
retention and underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing. Therefore, the F-test was used
to evaluate whether the independent variables jointly explain the dependent variable in
this study.
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Of the available software packages with capabilities to conduct the type of data
analyses required by this study, I used primarily the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) version 24.0., an approach that is consistent with the actions of previous
researchers who used SPSS to conduct quantitative studies (Banerjee, 2015; Banerjee &
Rangamani, 2014; Casero-Ripollés, 2017; Zeligman et al., 2018). The SPSS software
helped to conduct the in-depth analyses required to test the hypotheses that translate the
purpose of this study and operationalize the related research questions..
Study Validity
According to Claydon (2015), rigor in quantitative research is a function of
research quality, and poor quality may signal concerns about the accuracy and validity of
the research outcomes. Further, the research tool selected must meet the validity,
reliability, and practicality tests (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016). Validity indicates
whether the research measures the desired variable(s) (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016;
Delost & Nadder, 2014), whether the research is credible, true, and its assessment aligns
to the stated objectives (Zohrabi, 2013). Researchers can establish the validity of their
work by building an evidence-driven argument on the effectiveness of the research tool
(Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016; Hagan, 2014), to ensure that each type of validity equally
supports this evidence-building process (Hagan, 2014).
Bhaskar and Manjuladevi (2016) described three broad validity assessment, (a)
content validity assesses the extent to which the research tool appropriately aligns to the
purpose of the study, (b) construct validity questions whether the measurement conforms
to the theoretical frame and are the expected and actual relationships aligned, and (c)
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criterion validity evaluates the degree to which a new approach compares to existing
established approaches (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016).
Internal and External Validity
External validity exists where the research outcomes allow for generalization
from one specific experiment to other population groups or subjects, settings, or
treatments (Claydon, 2015; Vargas, Duff, & Faber, 2017; Zohrabi, 2013). Similar to
Hagan (2014), Lancsar and Swait’s (2014) description of external validity highlights the
importance of the predictive power of the research, and Zohrabi (2013) implied that
external validity exists if the research design generalizes beyond the sample of current
investigation to a wider population. According to Lancsar and Swait, external validity
refers to the capability of a model to generate sufficiently accurate forecasts or consistent
inferences extrapolated beyond the current frame to other populations or time periods.
Given that the sample date for this study includes current periods that is, up to
July 2018, the outcomes may have provided insights about future trends in underpricing
of IPOs in Jamaica and possibly other territories with similar economic and
developmental features. To the extent that the findings of this study provide these
insights, these results could help to alleviate concerns about external validity in this
study. On the other hand, the regulatory environment which governs the issuance of IPOs
continues to change, and therefore the possibility exists that future regulatory changes
could cast doubt on the generalization capability of this study’s research outcomes and
hence negatively impact the external validity of this study.
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Threats to external validity can surface if the sample is not sufficiently
representative of the population, if there is insufficient information on the sample (Neall,
& Tuckey, 2014) or, if the researcher applies specific stimuli to or administers the
experiment in a unique environment (Vargas et al., 2017). In either of these
circumstances, generalizations become problematic according to Vargas et al. (2017).
The sample of secondary data for this study included all IPOs issues during the study
period (i.e., 1986 to 2018) and an experimental design applying stimuli and treatments
was not adopted. Therefore, the threats to external validity highlighted was not be a
concern for this study.
Internal validity, which includes the evaluation of the relationship between
research components and the underlying theoretical or conceptual frame (Hagan, 2014),
occurs when noticeable differences between subsamples exist as a result of the research
treatment (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016). Bertossa, Harvey, Smith, and Chong (2014)
implied that retesting is one way to provide evidence of internal validity. Soliño, Farizo,
and Campos (2017) demonstrated that internal validity exists where no differences occur
in the estimated parameters across multiple subsamples. Neall and Tuckey (2014)
reported that internal validity allows for the drawing of causal inferences from the sample
and that in circumstances where the level of internal validity is high, there is credibility to
the argument that one variable has a causal effect on the other variable.
According to Venkatesh et al. (2016), threats to internal validity exist in three
forms - history, selection, and maturation. Additionally, Vargas et al. (2017) believed that
threats to internal validity are active if there are alternative explanations for the research
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outcomes because of (a) a change in the variables not initiated with the research, (b)
maturing in the research participants, (c) unplanned drop-outs of participants from the
research, and (d) participants becoming sensitized to the research. Many of these threats
imply the use of experimental or quasi-experimental research design with human
participants. As demonstrated by Venkatesh et al., a demographic comparison between
subsamples can help to identify threats to the internal validity of the research. I neither
employed an experimental nor included human participants in this study. The sample
included secondary data collected from archived, publicly available sources.
Accordingly, no expectation exists that these threats may impair the outcomes of the
research.
Statistical Conclusion Validity
Statistical conclusion validity (SCV) refers to the use of appropriate statistics to
draw inferences about the covariation between dependent and independent variables,
which may be vulnerable to incorrect statistical conclusions (Lachmann, Trapp, & Trapp,
2017). Neall and Tuckey (2014) implied that SCV relates to aspects of the sampling
processes, statistical power, and analytical procedures employed in the research and that
the SCV underpins the quality of and the users’ confidence in the research outcomes. The
measurement of statistical conclusion validity involves the use of an appropriate data
analysis framework and testing for statistical assumption violation (Venkatesh et al.,
2016).
Neall and Tuckey (2014) argued that over reliance on one data source can present
a threat to SCV. Lachmann et al. (2017) believed that SCV increases over time and
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therefore, the threat to SCV increases in quantitative non-experimental research designed
such as surveys because the data collection process typically occurs at a single point in
time. Threats to SVC can occur via the reliability of the research instrument, data
assumptions, and sample size (Long, 2016).
Given that SCV can be an indication of the quality of quantitative inferences
(Venkatesh et al., 2016), it is critical that researchers should test for specific threats to
SCV such as endogeneity issues which may surface in instances of omitted correlated
variables, faulty associations among variables, and erroneous conclusions about actual
relationships (Lachmann et al., 2017). Researchers can address the threat from the use of
a single data source by triangulating with multiple data sources (Neall & Tuckey, 2014).
Additionally, Lachmann et al. (2017) recommended the consideration of the
following additional factors: (a) reverse cause and effect (i.e., causality running counter
to normal expectation), (b) multicollinearity (occurs when independent variables are
highly correlated), (c) heteroscedasticity (variances of the error terms distributed
unevenly around the independent variables) and (d) sample outliers (Lachmann et al.,
2017). Researchers can improve this type of validity by using multiple sources of data
(Lachmann et al., 2017).
Data assumptions. Data must conform to some underlying assumptions if
multiple regression analysis is to produce reliable results and meaningful interpretation of
statistical tests (Miranda, 2015; Mooi & Sarstedt, 2014). These assumptions include
normality which requires normal distribution of the error terms and linearity where a
linear relationship should exists between the explanatory and explained variables (Zhang
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et al., 2015). Other assumptions reported by Lachmann et al. (2017) as threats to SCV are
multicollinearity, which exists in cases of highly correlated independent variables and
heteroscedasticity that is, dissimilar distribution of the variances of the error terms around
the independent variables. I used multiple regression as part of the analytical framework,
therefore the pre-analysis process of this study included the detection and correction of
any violation to these assumptions. The measures listed in the literature for testing these
assumptions include scatter diagrams and deviation from linearity statistic for linearity,
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, variance inflation factor (VIF) for multicollinearity, and
Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation and Breusch-Pagan test heteroscedasticity (Nunes,
Alvarenga, de Souza Sant’Ana, Santos, & Granato, 2015).
Sample size. The matter of sample size is a significant concern for researchers
(Delost & Nadder, 2014) because a sample size that is too small results in low statistical
power and this increases the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis when it is false
that is, a Type II error as well as threatens SCV. According to Fugard and Potts (2015),
the primary goal of the researcher is to select a sample size that balances the need for
manageability with that of addressing the research question. Boddy (2016) indicated that
small samples have a place, can provide reliable information, and are appropriate for
homogenous populations but if too small, these samples may not adequately address the
research question (Delost & Nadder, 2014; Garg, 2016). Ilieva, Hook, and Farah (2015)
opined that researchers must meet the significance level requirement if the goal is to
generalize research outcomes from a small sample to a population. The sample used in
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this study is 52 which complies with the estimated range of 43 and 68 generated the
G*Power software version 3.1.9.2, at the 95% confidence level (Faul et al., 2009).
Transition and Summary
According to Bhaskar and Manjuladevi (2016), when conducting a study, the
researcher should adopt a systematic approach to fulfill the purpose of the research, select
a research design, collect and analyze the data. Further, the adopted research framework
should be able to withstand scrutiny relating to ethical implications, validity, and
reliability (Bhaskar & Manjuladevi, 2016). In Section 2, I reproduced and expanded
aspects of Section 1 and discussed some of the components highlighted in Bhaskar and
Manjuladevi’s article cited above.
Specifically, this section of this study comprises the purpose statement, research
questions, and hypotheses, additional details on and justification for the quantitative
research method and correlational research design. Section 2 also contains a description
of the sampling process, techniques for data collections and data analyses, as well as a
discussion on ethical considerations, study validity, and reliability. Included in section 3
are the research outcomes, interpretations, implications for professional practice and
social change, recommendations for action and further research, as well as the research
summary and conclusions.
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Section 3: Application for Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between the IPO share retention ratio, the reputation of the IPO underwriter,
and IPO underpricing. The predictor variables were share retention ratio and underwriter
reputation, while the response variable was IPO underpricing. The analyses conducted on
a sample of IPO firms specific to the Jamaican market was to elucidate the specific
business problem that some company executives may not be aware of the relationship
between these variables. Despite the partial support for the alternate hypothesis that
represented the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing, the
overarching evidence from the analyses revealed no statistically significant relationship
for either the individual variables or joint impact of the overall model. However, the
overall insignificance of the relationship indicated by the research outcomes does not
abrogate the value-added benefits of this study to investors and firm stakeholders or the
contribution to the existing pool of literature on this topic.
Section 3 is principally about of the findings of this quantitative correlational
study. Accordingly, this section contains the outcomes from the data analyses, application
of the findings to professional practice and the implications for social change. Section 3
also encompasses recommendations for actions and further study, as well as personal
reflections and study summary and conclusions.
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Presentation of Findings
Assumptions Evaluation and Outcomes
As a prerequisite to conducting the data analysis for this study, I completed a
series of tests to ascertain whether there were violations of the key assumptions
underlying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The assessment of the assumptions is
a necessity in the process given that violation of any of these assumptions could lead to
bias and distorted outcomes, as well as flawed interpretations and inferences (Miranda,
2015; Mooi & Sarstedt, 2014). The assumptions tested include outliers, normality,
linearity, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity.
Outliers. An outlier is a data point such that the value of the response variable is
unusual (e.g., an abnormal distance from or very different from other observed values)
and contains high residual (Miranda, 2015). As recommended by Zygmont and Smith
(2014), I created using SPSS, boxplots to assess the extent of the outliers. Figure 1 shows
the boxplot for underpricing that is, the dependent variable, while Figure 2 represents the
boxplot with the extreme values for share retention, one of the two independent variables.
In both instances the asterisks indicate the presence of outliers.
When outliers, that is, observations substantially different from the other
observations exist, it may have a significant negative impact the results of regression
analysis (Regression with SPSS, 2014). Similar to the approach adopted by Li (2018)
and Mwangi (2016), I removed the outliers from the sample, which reduced the final
sample size to 48. As was the case for Mooi and Sarstedt (2014), the omitted
observations had complete information for both the dependent and independent variables,
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but the researcher removed these extreme values because of the possible adverse impact
on research outcomes. The removal of the outliers improved the quality of the sample as
reflected by the reduction in the difference between the original mean (with outliers) and
the trimmed mean (without outliers) from 4.24 to 1.72 and from 1.52 to 0.49 for the
underpricing and share retention variables respectively.

Figure 1. Boxplot for underpricing.
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Figure 2. Boxplot for share retention.
Normality. For the outcomes of the regression analysis to be valid, the sample
residuals should display a normal distribution and while the violation of the normality
assumption does not affect the quality of the estimated coefficients it can generate flawed
t-tests results (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2014). Adopting the approach applied by Miranda
(2015), as well as Zygmont and Smith (2014), I used the normal predicted probability (PP) plot and the Shapiro-Wilk (SW) statistic to assess whether this assumption holds. As
shown in Figure 3, the P-P plot indicates a non normal distribution and the outcome in
Table 3 is consistent with this conclusion with the SW statistic of .837 that is, significant
at the 5% level.
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Table 3
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality
Variable

Test Statistic

df

Sig

Underpricing

.837

48

.000

Figure 3. A normal P-P plot of regression standardized residuals.
Linearity. The assumption of linearity requires a straight line relationship
between the independent and dependent variables; if this relationship does not exist, the
results of the regression analysis will not provide the best fit for the data (Mooi &
Sarstedt, 2014). Similar to approach adopted by previous researchers who used the
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deviations from linearity (DL) test to assess the linear deviations in models (see Balcilar,
Gupta, & Miller, 2015; Hew & Kadir, 2016), I applied the DL statistic to evaluate the
status of the linearity assumption. If the DL statistic is greater than the level of
significance α then the researcher accepts the null hypothesis that there is a linear
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. As detailed in Appendix
B, the deviation from linearity estimate for this study, DL = 0.985, is greater than α =
0.05 and hence the linearity assumption holds for this sample.
Homoscedasticity. The homoscedasticity (equality of variances) assumption
holds if the residual variances appear randomly distributed, that is, residuals are equally
distributed (Miranda, 2015; Regression with SPSS, 2014). In addition to applying the
scatter plot to assess whether homoscedasticity is a concern for this sample, I also used
the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test statistic in the assessment process, and this is in line with the
suggestion by Nunes et al. (2015) and the technique used by Mwangi (2016). The results
of both measures confirmed that heteroscedasticity is a concern for this sample. The
scatter plot shows areas of concentration and areas of dispersion of the residuals (see
Figure 4). The violation of this assumption is also evidence from the statistically
significant BP test statistic, BP =33.99, P = .0000 < .05.
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Figure 4. Scatter plot of regression standardized predicted value against the
residuals.
Autocorrelation. This assumption requires that regression model error terms are
independent and uncorrelated for any two observations (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2014). The
Durbin–Watson (DW) statistic, which ranges from 0 to 4 with a midpoint of 2, can
indicate the presence of autocorrelation, that is, positively or negatively correlated
regression errors (Regression with SPSS, 2014). The DW table suggests that at the 5%
level of significance with a sample size of 50 and two regressors (predictor variables), the
critical values for the DW are 1.490 and 1.641. The DW statistic for the analysis from
this study is 2.095 and falls within the range of dU = 1.641 and 4-dU = 2.359, therefore,
autocorrelation is not a concern for this sample.
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Multicollinearity. A violation of the multicollinearity assumption occurs if the
independent variables show signs of significant correlation. Violation of this assumption
presents a concern because the estimated coefficients for the regression model may be
unstable as a result of overstated variances and standard errors (Regression with SPSS,
2014; Winship & Western, 2016). Even though the Spearman correlation matrix
presented in Table 6 indicated that the independent variables in this study are correlated, I
patterned Li’s (2018) approach and used the variance inflation factor (VIF) values as the
primary reliance to assess the extent of multicollinearity in this study. The VIF values is
the preferred option because it not only specify that multicollinearity is present but it also
show the extent of the impact on the variances of the estimated coefficients (see Pardoe,
2018). The presence of multicollinearity requires further investigation if the VIF values
exceed 4 and signals acute multicollinearity if the VIF values exceed 10 (Pardoe, 2018).
Table 4 indicates that the VIF values for each independent variable are within the
acceptable range, with VIF =1.1014 significantly less than 4. Therefore, multicollinearity
between the two independent variables is not a concern for this sample.
Table 4
VIF Statistic: Test of Multicollinearity
Variable
Share retention
Underwriter Reputation

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance
VIF
.986
1.014
.986
1.014

The assessment of the regression assumptions revealed mixed results. The
conclusions from these results are that the sample used in this study does not violate the
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linearity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation assumptions, but violates the normality,
autocorrelation, and homoscedasticity assumptions. Based on precedence by previous
researchers Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) and Donaldson (2015), I mitigated the impact
of the violated assumptions by applying robust (heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors) OLS regression analysis and replacing the traditional parametric tests for example,
Pearson coefficient matrix with nonparametric tests such as the Spearman rank
correlation.
Descriptive Statistics
According to Hu (2014), market sentiment is a significant driver of the number of
IPOs which, in turn indicates firms’ demand for capital and investor sentiments. The
increase in the number of IPOs issued in Jamaica in the last 5 years relative to previous
years could provide evidence to support Hu’s position. The sample of IPO firms included
in this study retained a percentage of their total outstanding shares, used the underwriting
and/or brokerage services of an investment bank, and currently trade on the JSE.
Additionally, the IPO stock for each firm had a positive market return on the first day of
trading relative to the offer price (i.e., underpriced). Accordingly, the number of data
points are uniform across all three variables. Share retention and underpricing,
independent and dependent variables respectively, expressed in ratio form while the
underwriter reputation is a dichotomous variable that is expressed in binary form. After
removing the four extreme values indicated by the boxplot for the share retention and
underpricing variables, the final sample declined to 48. Table 5 includes a summary of
the descriptive statistics for the research variables investigated in this study.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Research Variables
Variable

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Underpricing
Share Retention
Underwriter Reputation

48
48

.796
50.935

79.199
94.776

21.729
76.215

20.674
9.497

48

1

2

1.542

0.504

For this sample, the percentage of shares retained internally by the companies
(share retention) varied from 50.94% to 94.78%, with a standard deviation of 9.50% and
a mean of 76.22%. In line with the precedence set by previous researchers, Ammer and
Ahmad-Zaluki (2015), Jeribi et al. (2014), Song et al. (2014), and Wu and Wan (2014),
underwriter reputation, the other independent variable, is defined as a dichotomous
variable assuming a value of one or two. The value two indicates that one of the top three
underwriters or lead brokers in the Jamaican market brought the IPOs to market while the
value one denotes otherwise. The ranking of the underwriters in the sample reflected a
combination of the Carter and Manaster (1990) approach that is market share based the
number of IPOs underwritten as well as the Meggesson and Weiss (1991) method of
market share based on dollar value of IPOs underwritten. The high-reputation
underwriters were the top three underwriters, based on their combined scores, while the
others assumed the designation of low-reputation. As a result of the categorization of this
variable, the descriptive statistics are restrictive but included in the table for
completeness.
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For the firms sampled for this study, the minimum and maximum values for IPO
underpricing were 0.80% and 79.20% respectively, while the standard deviation was
20.67%. Additionally, IPO underpricing averaged 21.73% suggesting that the first-day
closing price for the IPO stock was on average, 21.73%, higher than the offer price.
According to Kubícek, Strouhal, and Stamfestová (2017), underpricing could mean that
secondary investors, who bought shares on the first day, had access to more information
and responded positively to the market price based on their assessment of the available
information. This level of underpricing was similar to the 23.8% that Choi and Nam
(1998) found from their sample of two IPOs in the Jamaican market from 1986 to 1991
but lower than the average of 41.33% estimated for the 15 developing countries (see
Ritter, 2017; United Nations–OHRLLS, 2015). After adjusting for the extreme values of
114%, 88% and 149% for China, India and Jordon respectively, IPO underpricing for the
remaining 12 countries from this same sample, averaged 22.5% which was close to
Jamaica’s mean estimated in this study.
Inferential Results
Research hypotheses 1 and 2. In research hypothesis 1, I postulated that there a
no statistically significant relationship between the percentage of share retained by the
IPO firm (share retention) and the level of first-day return on the IPO stock
(underpricing). Similarly, the prediction in research hypothesis 2 was that the relationship
between the reputation of the underwriter who brought the IPO to market (underwriter
reputation) and IPO underpricing is not statistically significant. To test these hypotheses,
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I conducted the Spearman rank correlation test and reported the outcomes in the matrix in
Table 6.
Table 6
Spearman Correlation Matrix for Primary Research Variables
Variable

1

2

1. Share Retention

1.00

2. Underwriter Reputation

.257**

1.00

3. Underpricing

.059

.234*

3

1.00

* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05.
For Hypothesis 1, there was no statistically significant relationship between share
retention and IPO underpricing at neither the α = .1 and α = .05, r = .059, p = .35.
Accordingly, I accepted the null hypothesis. For Hypothesis 2, there was a statistically
significant relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing at α = .1, r
= .234, p = .055, but not α = .05, providing partial support for the alternate hypothesis.
Research hypothesis 3. According to null hypothesis 3, the reputation of the IPO
underwriter has no statistically significant effect on the relationship between share
retention and IPO underpricing. To evaluate this hypothesis, I applied the HCSE
regression with IPO underpricing and share retention as the predicted and predictive
variables respectively for each group of underwriters, those categorized as highreputation versus low-reputation. Table 7 outlines the key descriptive statistics for each
group of IPO firms based on the underwriter that supported their IPOs.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Research Variables by Underwriter Reputation
Variable

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

77.23
24.82

10.98
21.27

High-Reputation Underwriters
Share Retention
Underpricing

26
26

50.93
.80

94.78
71.50

Low-Reputation Underwriters
Share Retention

22

55.53

83.33

75.01

7.45

Underpricing

22

.7958

79.20

18.07

19.80

The total sample of 48, approximately evenly divided, includes more prestigious
underwriters accounting for 54.17% of the IPOs brought to market over the period 1986
to July 2018 and the remaining 45.83% by less prestigious underwriters. The mean
underpricing was 37.35% higher for the IPOs supported by the high-reputation
underwriters. This outcome is inconsistent with the findings and argument presented by
Gumanti et al. (2017) and Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) who indicated that the use of
prestigious underwriters should communicate to the market the confidence the firm’s
principals have in their firm, thereby leading to lower underpricing.
The results presented in Table 8, indicate that the explanatory and predictive
power of share retention on IPO underpricing was not statistically significant for either
group of IPO firms and therefore I accepted the null hypothesis. Despite the statistically
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zero difference between the impact of share retention on underpricing for both groups,
the outcomes suggest that share retention has a stronger influence on underpricing for the
firms supported by the more prestigious group of underwriters versus those supported by
the less prestigious underwriters, with R2 slightly higher at .02, p = .31 versus R2 = .01, p
= .75, respectively.
Table 8
Model Summary and Regression Coefficients by Underwriter Reputation
Variable

B

Robust
T
Std. Error

Sig (t)

R2

F

Sig(F)

.02

1.06

.31

01

.110

.75

High-Reputation Underwriters
Constant

3.23

19.91

.16

.87

Share Retention

.28

.27

1.03

.31

Low-Reputation Underwriters
Constant

32.53

42.44

.77

.45

Share Retention

-.19

.59

-.33

.75

Dependent Variable: Underpricing

Research hypothesis 4. To determine if, as stated by Research Hypothesis (null)
4, share retention and underwriter reputation do not jointly explain IPO underpricing, I
conducted an OLS regression based on HCSE. The use of a HCSE regression is
consistent with analysis applied by Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) and Song et al. (2014)
who found heteroscedasticity to be a concern in their samples IPO firms operating in the
Indonesian market. Table 9 includes the results of the HCSE regression analysis with
share retention and underwriter reputation as the independent variables and underpricing
as the dependent variable.
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Table 9
Overall Model: Regression Coefficients
Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

T

Sig

0.03

.98

B

Robust Std.
Error

Constant

0.56

20.19

Share Retention

0.15

0.26

0.07

0.57

.57

Underwriter Reputation

6.42

6.17

0.16

1.04

.30

Beta

Dependent Variable: Underpricing

The individual relationship between share retention and IPO underpricing with a
beta = .07, p = .57 as well as underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing with a beta =
.16, p= 1.04, were not statistically significant at the .05 level. Based on the results of the
HCSE regression the equation from the model is
IPO underpricingi = 0.56 + 0.07share retentioni + 0.16 underwriter reputationi
The outcome from this model, as seen in table 10, supports the results obtained at the
individual variable level and indicates no statistically significant relationship between the
independent and the dependent variables with F(2, 45) = 0.78, p = 0.455, R2 = 0.032.
This result provided support for the null hypothesis indicating that the percentage of
shares retained by the IPO firm and the reputation of the underwriter engaged by the firm
to bring the IPO to market do not jointly explain IPO underpricing experienced by the
IPO firms in the Jamaican market. Additionally, the R2 value of 0.032 indicated that the
combined effect of share retention and underwriter reputation (the predictor variables)
only account for about 3% of variations in IPO underpricing (the response variable).
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Based on these results I accepted the null hypothesis and concluded that share retention
and underwriter reputation jointly or individually do not explain IPO underpricing.
Table 10
Model Summary
Change Statistics
R
.18

R Square
.03

Robust Std.
Error
20.79

R Square
Change

F Change

df1 df2

Sig. F
Change

.03

.78

2

.47

45

The primary research question for this study was to ascertain if a relationship
existed between IPO underpricing, the dependent variable, and share retention and
underwriter reputation, the independent variables by examining IPOs issued during the
period 1986 to 2018 in the Jamaican market. The percentage of shares retained by the
IPO firm relative to the number of shares outstanding represented the measurement for
share retention. The other independent variable, underwriter reputation, operationalized
as a dichotomous variable with two and one denoting high-reputation and low-reputation
underwriters respectively. The combined market share of the number and value of IPOs
brought to market by the underwriter represented underwriter reputation. While IPO
underpricing, the dependent variable, referred to the return on the IPO stock on the first
day of trading relative to offer price.
The analysis involved both the treatment of all the IPOs in the sample as single
group, as well as dissecting the sample in two categories based on the underwriter
reputation variable defined above. The overall results of the study indicated no
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statistically significant relationship between share retention, underwriter reputation, and
underpricing at both the full sample and segment levels. Generally the results at the
singular variable level was consistent with the overall outcomes, except for the limited
significance found between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing at the α = 0.1.
The result which indicated limited relationship between underwriter reputation
and IPO underpricing could imply that within the efficient market framework the
reputation of the underwriter selected for the IPO may potentially assuage the
information asymmetry associated with the newness of the IPO firm and the concerns of
prospective investors. Given the reputational capital that the underwriter brings to the
IPO process, IPO firms who engage high-reputation underwriters receive significant
incremental benefits, (Bangsund, 2014; Fernando et al., 2015). The investors may
interpret the reputation of the underwriter and the related credibility to IPOs as a signal of
the strength and quality of a firm especially young firms (Bangsund, 2014; He et al.,
2015).
Given this position, as well as the results of this study, investors may benefit from
paying attention to the firm’s choice of the underwriter. Moreover, executives/owners of
IPO firms and investors could contemplate the possibility that underwriter reputation may
provide some insights into the quality of the IPO firm. Under these circumstances, the
choice of a high-reputation may mitigate the extent of information asymmetry associated
with the liability and related risks of the market newness of the IPO firm (see Handa &
Singh, 2014; Imam & Jaber, 2014; Peterle & Berk, 2016)
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Regarding share retention, the one of the premises of the signaling argument is
that the greater portion of the shares retained by an IPO firm , the lower the degree of
information inequity between investor and firm and by extension the lower the
underpricing (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; Jiang et al., 2015; Miloud, 2014). This
argument did not hold in the Jamaican market based on the outcomes of this study. A
possible explanation may be that the percentage share offered to the public is typically
low, satisfying only the minimum requirement, in many cases so as not to relinquish
control of the firm. To retain controlling interest, firms issuing IPOs in the Jamaican
market tend to offer to the public the mandatory minimum percentage of shares
outstanding stipulated by the JSE. Accordingly, investors may want to avoid sole reliance
on the percentage of shares retained by the firm (i.e., share retention) as a signal of
quality particularly if the firm adheres to the minimum requirement.
There is no consensus in the literature about the impact of share retention and
underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and as such evidence exists that both
supports and refutes the results of this study. Both Gumanti et al. (2017) and Darmadi
and Gunawan (2013) obtained results similar to that of this study when they investigated
IPOs in Indonesia. From the results of their distinct studies, Gumanti et al. and Darmadi
and Gunawan found an insignificant relationship between the shares retained and the
level of underpricing. As is the case for this study, Kumar (2017) found a positive
coefficient for share retention as a predictor variable. The findings from the research, on
whether concentrated or dispersed ownership among French IPOs, impacted IPO
underpricing, led Miloud (2014) to conclude that French investors do not appear to
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interpret the level of share retention by pre-IPO owners as worth contemplating in their
investment decisions. This finding may be one of the possible explanations for the results
of this study which indicated no statistically significant relationship between share
retention and IPO underpricing.
On the other hand, there are also findings that run counter to those of this study.
Deb (2014) investigated IPOs issued in the U.S. market and found evidence to indicate
that the level of share retained can help to reduce underpricing. Similarly, Ammer and
Ahmad-Zaluki (2015) investigated Malaysian companies that issued IPOs and found that
a negative relationship existed between management ownership and IPO underpricing.
The result from the research conducted by Jiang et al. (2015) indicated a negative
relationship between the number of shares retained by an IPO issuer and the level of
underpricing.
Boulton et al. (2017) suggested that the use of reputable financial intermediaries,
such as underwriters, is one way for firms to reduce information asymmetry, and
Banerjee and Rangamani (2015) argued that informal certification infused by the
reputation of the lead investment banker is a pivotal signal for investors. In their research
on IPOs issued in the Indonesian market, Indriani and Marlia (2015) found evidence of a
significant negative correlation between underwriter reputation and underpricing. These
results contradicted the results from this study, which indicated no significant relationship
between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. The outcomes from the research
by Gumanti et al. (2015) supported the findings of Indriani and Marlia, as well as
position that reputable underwriters could lead to lower underpricing because their
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support reduces the need to underprice (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013; He et al., 2015). The
results of this study do not support these findings.
However, the literature also provided support for the outcomes of this study.
Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2015) found a positive but insignificant relationship and
suggested that IPOs supported by high-reputation underwriters had increased
underpricing relative to those supported by the low-reputation underwriters. Chen et al.
(2017) also found a positive but insignificant relationship when they incorporated
underwriter reputation as part of their research on the relationship between IPO
underpricing relative to economic freedom across 22 countries from 1993 to 2014. Wu
and Wan (2014) in their research undertaken about IPOs issued by Chinese firms, found
evidence to suggest an insignificant correlation between underwriter reputation and
underpricing.
The outcome of the research conducted by Xu, Wang, and Long, J. (2017) in the
same market supported the statistical insignificance relationship found by Wu and Wan
(2014). Song et al. (2014) found, like this study, a positive coefficient representing
underwriter reputation relative to IPO underpricing. An additional finding in this study
was the higher underpricing for IPO stocks supported by reputable underwriters,
underpricing for these IPOs averaged 37.35% higher than those supported by nonprestigious underwriters. The the higher underpricing for the prestigious group of
underwriteres concurred with what Ammer & Ahmad-Zaluki (2015) found in the
Malaysian market. Similar results also emerged from the research by Jeribi et al. (2014)
in the Tunisian market where they found that the average return on stocks supported by
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reputable underwriters was more than four times higher than that for low reputation
underwriters.
Applications to Professional Practice
In this study, I sought to determine if a relationship exists between share
retention, underwriter reputation, and IPO underpricing by examining IPOs issued during
the period 1986 to 2018 in the Jamaican market. The results of the study at both the
overall and segment levels, indicated no overall statistically significant relationship
between share retention, underwriter reputation, and underpricing and that the
independent variables are weak predictors of the dependent variable. However the
statistically insignificant findings of this study do not compromise the potential
contribution to the business and professional communities.
The outcomes from this study may be useful to investors in the Jamaican market
to guide their expectations regarding first-day return on their investment in an IPO stock,
as well as their general investment decisions. Specifically, the results may direct investors
into considering alternate indications of IPO quality and firm performance other than
share retention and underwriter reputation. Additionally, this study may lead to more
informed investment decisions by forcing increased information disclosure from issuing
companies and providing investors with greater access to information. Moreover
increased access to information that may accrue to potential investors may materialize
over and above the mandatory disclosures required by the JSE for firms seeking to list on
the JSE’s main or junior markets.
.
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This may study adds value to the business community. The results may guide
executives and other principals of IPO firms in making key decisions about the IPO
process including offer volume, offer price, and choice of underwriter. Furthermore, the
findings may help company executives in Jamaica and other small developing countries
to optimize the IPO process to obtain the necessary funding as well as force them to
consider their choice of signals to communicate to investors. The finding that IPO
underpricing averaged 21.73% may help IPO firms to factor in their strategic and
financial plans possible funding shortfall as a result of underpricing. Knowledge of the
extent of IPO underpricing in the Jamaican market may also allow companies and
organizations lobbying on their behalf to frame, justify, and present arguments to
minimize IPO underpricing and increase IPO proceeds.
The outcomes of this study may also help companies to more effectively plan for
the IPO proceeds given that Gumanti et al. (2017) found that the purpose of the IPO
proceeds matter. There is lower IPO underpricing and hence higher IPO proceeds from
IPOs slated to finance investment or growth relative to IPOs designed to fund operations
(Gumanti et al., 2017). Moreover, the expectations for firms when IPOs generate
sufficient proceeds are that firm should transform production techniques and commit to
CSP objectives (Luo et al., 2015).
Regulatory and government policymakers may also find the outcomes of this
study useful in crafting polices, designing processes and procedures to create a businessfriendly environment that will stimulate employment, growth and development in small
economies. Ritter (2015) reported that from 1996 to 2010, the average U.S company
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added 822 jobs after a successful IPO and Pandes and Robinson (2014) indicated that the
reduction in IPOs in the United States from 2000 to 2012 resulted in the loss of millions
of jobs. Finally, the academic community may find the contents and outcomes of this
study to be relevant additions to their course material as well as prospective research
projects.
Implications for Social Change
In addressing the implication for social change in section 1 of this study, I
indicated that the results of this research may contribute to social change by improving
the quality of life and overall standard of living across households. This potential social
change is possible because, as suggested by Sappin (2016), new businesses and business
growth can lead to increased employment and improved socioeconomic indicators such
as health and education. The limited relationship between underwriter reputation and
underpricing and the statistically insignificant correlation between share retention and
underpricing indicated by the results of this study, do not adversely affect the relevance
or importance of this study in fostering social change.
Even with no overall statistically significant relationship as indicated by this
study, successful IPOs will result in some firms in a post-IPO scenario outperforming the
pre-IPO status and achieving improved growth and profitability (Gonzalez, 2014). This
improved post-IPO performance may help to enhance compensation and working
conditions for existing firm employees, and generate growth and expansion which can
increase employment opportunities for the communities served by these firms (see
Gonzalez, 2014; Ritter, 2015). This scenario is particularly valid for small and medium
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enterprise (SMEs) that use IPOs as avenues to attract investment including from venture
capitalists (Heo et al., 2014). These smaller companies can exploit stock exchange
listings to expand and create the opportunity to build their local communities and national
economy (Pandes & Robinson, 2014). The JSE junior market is one such stock exchange.
The acceptance of most of the null hypotheses in this study will not negatively
impact investors’ expectations regarding their right to increased information disclosure
about IPOs and signals of firm quality from IPO firms. If the tenets of the EMH are true,
then increased information disclosure may improve market efficiency by reducing the
information asymmetry among IPO stakeholders as well as the difference between the
IPO issue price and first-day market price. The contents and findings of this research can
expand the pool of existing literature on this topic, especially relating to small developing
countries.
Recommendations for Action
Detailed scrutiny of the outcomes of this study provided a basis from which to
highlight recommended actions for IPO stakeholders, particularly business owners and
investors hoping to use the IPO option to raise funds and bolster the return on their
investment portfolio respectively. Additionally, given that this study may be the first on
this topic in the Jamaican context, the investment and business communities could benefit
from its general information, the detailed findings and country specificity. The first action
required is an acknowledgment by the market that share retention and underwriter
reputation may not be reliable predictors of IPO underpricing. Therefore, considerations
should be given to alternate market and company fundamentals as predictors of firm
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quality and performance, information asymmetry between investors and firm, as well as
IPO underpricing.
Second, investors, both institutional and private should consider replacement
signals of firm quality to guide expectations about first-day return on an IPO stock.
Company executives and other principals who have the strategic objective of optimizing
IPO proceeds and reducing money left on the table could, given the outcomes of this
study, adopt other signals to communicate IPO quality to prospective investors. Third,
regulatory and government policymakers charged with framing relevant legislations, IPO
governance policies, or even country-specific economic growth objectives may have to
contemplate how the findings of this study can help to achieve their objectives.
Finally, academia may choose to augment their course material or assign
expanded research using aspects of this study. As required, I will publish the results of
this study in the ProQuest / UMI dissertation database, but will also explore additional
opportunities in academic journal publications. I also hope to capitalize on opportunities
to share findings at seminars and conferences targeted at the investment, business, and
academic communities.
Recommendations for Further Study
In this segment of the study, I highlighted opportunities for additional future
research. The possibilities for future research could span two broad areas, modification or
expansion of the key components of this study including the variables, methodology,
model, and possibly sample and geographic setting. Future research by way of
modification of this study could include any of the following options. First, refining

133
variables, for example, defining share retention as the difference between actual share
retention ratio and the mandatory maximum of 80%, instead of as currently defined in
absolute terms or redefining underwriter reputation by another method for example, the
approach advocated by Jeribi (2015). instead on the singular reliance on market share.
Second, refitting the methodology and/or the model by introducing multiple categories
for underwriter reputation instead of an all-or-nothing approach implied by a
dichotomous definition used in this study. Another possibility is to fit another statistical
model or analytical approach to the data and segregating the sample by firm indicators
such as industry, company type, family-owned versus public owned, or classifying
companies by the listing information that is, JSE’s main or junior market. Third,
additional research options could also include expanding the parameters and scope of the
current study.
The expansion approach could apply in the following configurations. First, a
future researcher could expand the list of variables by including control variables specific
to company or market fundamentals such as firm type, size, performance, ownership
structure, industry type as well as CSP factors. In the examination of the relationship
between pre-IPO CSP and post-IPO performance in the Chinese market, Jia and Zhang
(2014) found that CSP approach and actions by the IPO firm pre and post-IPO were
strategic considerations for the investors. The addition of control variables could help
improve the accuracy of variable estimates, remove some of the distortions and noise, as
well as improve conservativeness of the hypotheses tests (Becker, et al., 2016; Bernerth
et al., 2017). Moreover, including control variables would be in line with the approach
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adopted by previous researchers such as Deb (2014), Darmadi and Gunawan, (2013); Yin
et al. (2015).
Second, a prospective investigation could increase the sample size by stretching
the sample dates for the study or applying a multi-country, instead of a single country,
approach to the research. Third, given the implication of Deng and Zhou (2016) that there
may be unique characteristics and determinants embedded in specific markets and the
empirical differences that Ritter (2003b) found between the European and American IPO
markets, one future research option may be to incorporate a proxy variable to represent
social, cultural or economic differences. This recommendation is worth consideration
given the evidence from this study that these traditional drivers of IPO underpricing were
not significant in this small developing country compared to some of the findings of
previous researchers in developed, emerging and larger developing economies.
Finally, the possibility also exists to research IPO market efficiency as well as
post-IPO performance of the IPO firms in Jamaica. Murthy et al. (2016) indicated that in
an efficient IPO market there should be low initial gains at listing, moderate gains in the
short-run gain and improved gains in the long-run. Jia and Dairui (2014) found that the
post-IPO performance and survivability dependent on the company’s pre-IPO status and
offering characteristics, healthy financial indicators including profitability, corporate
ownership and governance structure other company and industry specifics. These
proposed channels to future research could provide increased insights, improve the
predictability of the independent variables, and enhance the signals relating to firm
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quality and possible reduction in the level of information asymmetry between IPO
stakeholders.
Reflections
The purpose of this study was to determine whether a relationship exists between
share retention, underwriter reputation, and IPO underpricing. Despite finding no
evidence of a statistically significant relationship, the lessons learned from having gone
through this process are noteworthy. First, the outcomes of this study provide insights
and indications where they previously did not exist with this level of details and country
specificity, creating value to investors, firms and academic practitioners, and researchers.
Second, the outcomes of no or restricted significance of the individual variables and the
lack of joint impact of the variables on IPO underpricing suggest that share retention and
underwriter reputation are not reliable predictors of underpricing in the Jamaican or a
small developing country context. Accordingly, the relevant stakeholders will have to
look to other predictors or drivers to understand, dissect, or interrogate IPO underpricing
specific to small economies.
Finally, I benefitted from some personal lessons in research, perseverance, and
patience. I spent an incalculable number of hours rummaging through old paper files of
firm prospectuses and trading sheets to identify relevant data on IPO offer price, offer
volume, number of shares outstanding, underwriter supporting the IPO, and first-day
trading price. Additionally, the decision process for the appropriate statistical method and
analytical tools was tedious. The regression assumption evaluation revealed a violation of
critical assumptions that must be met for the results of ordinary least squares (OLS)
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regression to be reliable. Consequently, I had to decide whether to transform the data, use
an alternative methodology or tool, or both. A protracted contemplative process occurred
because the preferred option of applying an alternative statistical tool presented a
challenge to execute. The experience from both these scenarios will prove valuable
should I decide to use this study as a launching pad for subsequent research.
Summary and Study Conclusions
An IPO is one of the most significant events in a firm’s life cycle and often
requires the IPO firms to undergo structural, policies, operational and procedural
modifications and adjustments including IPO underpricing (Algebaly, Ibrahim, &
Ahmad-Zaluki, 2014; Wu, 2014). IPO underpricing, a ubiquitous phenomenon well
documented and demonstrated in many economies around the world, spans industries and
time periods, still without an appropriate explanation (Ivanauskas, 2015). As implied by
Dimovski, Ratcliffe, and Keneley (2017), the disparity between first-day trading price
and initial offer price remains a pricing puzzle. The drivers of underpricing differences
across and within markets remain essentially an unexplored question (Yaakob & Nazri
Abd Halim, 2016).
Previous research work targeted the relationship between share retention and
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing in developed, emerging, and larger
developing countries (Ammer & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2015; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013;
Gumanti et al., 2015; He et al., 2015) and yielded debatable outcomes. Additionally, the
first-day returns earned by initial subscribing investors reported in many of these
countries have, on average, been positive (Dimovski et al., 2017). However, studies
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specific to small developing countries or island developing states did not occur frequently
in the literature, and I found only one instance of Jamaica mentioned in any study on this
topic (Choi & Nam, 1998). With a sample of two IPOs issued from 1986 to 1991, an
average stake sold of 38% and total IPO proceeds of US $20 million, Jamaica was the
only small developing country included in list of countries (see Choi & Nam, 1998).
The primary objective of this quantitative correlational study was to determine if a
relationship exists between share retention, underwriter reputation, and IPO underpricing
using a sample of IPOs firms listed on the JSE. To achieve this objective, I conducted
isolated and joint assessment of the interrelatedness of the variables. The outcomes of the
analyses provided no evidence of a statistically significant relationship even after
segregating the sample by the reputation of the underwriting firm that supported the
IPOs. The primary analytical tools employed in the assessment were the Spearman rank
correlation matrix and OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
At both the individual and global levels, share retention was insignificant at the α
= .05 in predictive changes to underpricing, while there was a limited significance at the
α = .1 but not at the α = .05 for the relationship between underwriter reputation and
underpricing. The universal outcome that no statistically significant relationship exists
between the independent and dependent variables in this study and that share retention
and underwriter reputation were not strong predictors of IPO underpricing resulted in an
acceptance of the null hypotheses at the α = .05 level of significance. However, the lack
of overall significance of the model in explaining IPO underpricing does not contravene
the relevance or importance of the study nor does it infringe on its role in expanding the
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pool of literature on this topic or pointing others to the world of research possibilities that
awaits.
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Appendix A: Data Analysis Plan

Research Questions

Related Null Hypotheses

Relevant
Variables

Statistical
Approach &
Measure

1. What is the relationship,
if any between a firm’s IPO
share retention ratio and
IPO underpricing?

There is no statistically
significant relationship
between firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and IPO
underpricing

Share
retention &
IPO
underpricing

Spearman
ranked
correlation
matrix

2. What is the relationship,
if any between the
reputation of the IPO
underwriter and IPO
underpricing

There is no statistically
significant relationship
between the reputation of
the IPO underwriter and
IPO underpricing

Underwriter
reputation &
IPO
underpricing

Spearman
ranked
correlation
matrix

3. Does the reputation of the
IPO underwriter impact the
relationship between the
firm’s IPO share retention
ratio and IPO underpricing?

The reputation of the IPO
underwriter has no
statistically significant
impact on the relationship
between IPO share
retention ratio and IPO
underpricing

Share
retention,
underwriter
reputation &
IPO
underpricing

HCSE
multiple
regression; ttest

4. What is the relationship,
if any between firm’s IPO
share retention ratio, the
reputation of the IPO
underwriter and IPO
underpricing

The firm’s IPO share
retention ratio and the
reputation of the IPO
underwriter do not jointly
explain IPO underpricing

Share
retention,
underwriter
reputation &
IPO
underpricing

HCSE
multiple
regression;
(F-test)
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Appendix B: Deviation of Linearity Statistic: Test of Linearity

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

(Combined)

9617.747

33

291.447

.390 .987

Linearity

149.501

1

149.501

.200 .662

9468.246

32

295.883

.396 .985

ANOVA Table
Underpricing
Share Retention

Between
Groups

Deviation from
Linearity

Sig.
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Appendix C: Sample of the Raw Data Used in the Study
Company ID
(Assigned for the
purpose of this
research)

Independent
variable (%)

Independent variable
(dichotomous)

Dependent
variable (%)

MO001

80.00

1

2.50

JM003

60.00

2

14.91

JR011

80.00

2

15.00

MH009

94.78

2

18.18

MM010

83.33

1

10.42

MF021

72.73

1

14.04

JR029

82.01

1

12.89

MF026

80.00

1

79.20

JO030

73.00

1

3.61

JI031

75.00

1

14.54

MO053

31.29

2

1.52

JO032

79.38

1

0.98

MF031

84.71

2

17.13

MF054

90.00

2

19.97

MC040

74.90

2

45.45

JO039

80.00

1

169.50

JM040

52.17

2

1.04

JO041

83.17

2

60.67

